BACK STORY WITH DANA LEWIS
Dana Lewis is a veteran World Affairs Correspondent. He's been everywhere. From global war zones to the streets of London where he is based.
He has been based in Jerusalem, and Moscow.
And he loves talking to people about whats behind the headlines. Award winning. "A real in the trenches reporter". Great interviewing skills and easy to listen to.
BACK STORY WITH DANA LEWIS
Ukraine's Strategic Push: Kursk
Can Ukraine's audacious tactics in the Kursk region really turn the tide in this complex conflict with Russia? Join us for an in-depth discussion featuring Malcolm Davis from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, as we explore the critical implications of these strategic maneuvers on both sides. Hear our analysis on why this conflict might drag on through 2025, hinging largely on Western military aid and potential shifts in the U.S. administration.
Discover why Ukraine's victory is not just a regional matter but a global imperative for maintaining the balance between authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies.
Can the European Union sustain the conflict if U.S. support dwindles under a future conservative administration? In our conversation with Anthony Constantini, we scrutinize the limitations Ukraine faces against Russia's vast reserves and explore how a shift in U.S. foreign policy could impact the European Union’s strategic position. We delve into the moral and strategic challenges of Ukraine's right to self-defense amidst continuous missile and drone attacks, with former Navy Commander and Norway Military Attache Hans Petter Midttun.
From your vantage point, is Ukraine losing this war?
Malcolm Davis:They're not losing, but they're not winning. I think that's the challenge is that the war is stalemated.
Anthony Constantini:It's become increasingly clear that Ukraine is, simply put, running out of men and running out of the capabilities to pursue a really long-term war.
Dana Lewis :They are not for the moment, rushing to take back Kursk at any cost.
Hans Petter Midttun:No, they do not. But this is not an on-off switch and I think a lot of people would expect something to change immediately, and I don't think that was ever to be expected. The reality is that Ukraine has, by its action, stretched the front line. It's forced Russia to reconsider the disposition of its forces.
Dana Lewis :Hi everyone and welcome to another edition of Backstory. I'm Dana Lewis. I took a break for part of the summer. I hope you had some relaxation too. Time to get on with the discussion. Ukraine here's the question Is Ukraine losing? It seems like it could be. It seems like Ukraine is unable to push Russia out of occupied areas in the east, even with Ukraine's bold land grab inside Russia in Kursk. And the bigger question what's at stake? Does Russia have bigger plans that go beyond Ukraine? I mean, a lot of people say it does. Do we buy the argument? Democracy and freedom are on the line in Europe and beyond. Well, different guests this week, different perspectives and views, and that's the backstory on Ukraine. Malcolm Davis is with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. He's an expert on future warfare and military technology, and just not future warfare but existing warfare, and there is a lot of it, malcolm, and I welcome you back to the podcast. Can you give me a reality check from your vantage point? Is Ukraine losing this war?
Malcolm Davis:They're not losing, but they're not winning. I think that's the challenge is that the war is stalemated. Now. Ukraine have made this very audacious and daring offensive into the Kursk region and they're holding on to most of the territory that they've captured, and clearly that's humiliated Putin. It's also made it more complicated for the Russians to reinforce their military forces inside Ukraine in the Donetsk and Luhansk areas of the Donbass. So the Ukrainians have actually done a rather bold and audacious move that seems to have paid off for the moment, but at the same time, the Russians in the Donetsk region are making advances towards key towns such as Pokharaevsk, which are important from a logistics perspective, and the Ukrainians are basically withdrawing from that area. So it's possible that as the Ukrainians take the territory in Kursk, the Russians are advancing in Donetsk, and so it really is a case of stalemate rather than the Ukrainians winning or the Russians winning. It's not over yet, and I suspect this war will go well into 2025 and maybe even beyond 2025.
Dana Lewis :Is Kursk a fool's errand of sorts? They're pulling forces from the, from the eastern front, um, and, as you've noted, the russians continue to kind of bulldoze forward. Every few days another village falls, or they, you know they advance somewhere. Not, it's not rapid, but it is consistent. Um, why spend your forces up in curse where, where you know the ukrainians are probably going to get pushed out of there eventually anyway?
Malcolm Davis:Well, it's uncertain as to whether the Ukrainians will be forced out. If the Ukrainians can find defensible lines and hold that territory, that gives them a valuable negotiating chip in any future.
Dana Lewis :I can argue with you and say, absolutely, they're going to be pushed out of there because this is Russian territory. But three weeks in I would be blushing saying, well, maybe you're right stand.
Malcolm Davis:they are still pushing forward in some areas, but I think that holding onto that territory is important, if they can, because it gives them that valuable negotiating chip in any future ceasefire negotiations. Secondly, the more territory they can hold, the more difficult it is for the Russians to reinforce their forces in the Donbass area and Donetsk and Luhansk and over time that then does have a deleterious effect on Russian combat capability as the Russians begin to run low on supplies of fuel and munitions and, essentially, food and other things like that. So it evens out in probably 2025. Things will slow down in the sort of late spring, early sorry the late autumn, early winter. I've got it's sort of like getting my seasons right in the different hemispheres and I think that we'll see what happens in the new year and I think also the Russians and again.
Dana Lewis :I've interrupted you and I'm not going to do it again. I apologize, but what do you mean it's going to even out? I'm a bit turned upside down with time as well. Now You're saying that the Russians are running out and Ukraine? If right now Ukraine is on a back foot, you think in 2025 they won't be?
Malcolm Davis:I think that if Western military assistance continues to flow to Ukraine, then Ukraine can hang on. They can't necessarily win, but they can continue to blunt Russian advances. The Russians are making advances in some areas, but at great cost. Now the Russians have a superior military industrial capacity in terms of turning out munitions and so forth. So the key thing that will emerge in 2025 is, firstly, does that Western military system dry up? If you have a change of administration in the US after the presidential election and Trump gets back in, then I think it is almost certain that that US military assistance will dry up, in which case Europe will be hard-pressed to fill the void left by the US. But at the same time, the Russians have got to step up their military production and they may have to think about a mobilisation, and that will be politically unpopular for Putin if he does go down the path of mobilisation. So it really does get into a situation of who can acquire or produce the most munitions and who can maintain their hold on territory into 2025.
Dana Lewis :I mean, I've traveled across Russia, I've seen the big old Soviet Union. Your head spins around when you enter some of these cities and you realize all they ever did was produce munitions. All they ever did was produce warplanes or tanks or chemical weapons or biological weapons. I mean Ronald Reagan's evil empire. And the fact is that we're pouring more and more money into Ukraine and it doesn't seem to have changed the battlefield.
Malcolm Davis:Well, I think we have an obligation to do so, because let's remember the facts here it was Russia that launched this war. They were the aggressors, they were the ones that invaded Ukraine, which is a sovereign nation state and a Western democracy that invaded Ukraine, which is a sovereign nation state and a Western democracy. They did so because they sought to essentially wipe Ukraine off the face of the map. They sought territorial expansion. That was against every single rule in the rules-based international order, and if we hadn't have poured that money into Ukraine, if we hadn't have supported Ukraine, then that would have sent a terrible precedent, not just in terms of European security but in terms of, for example, how China thinks about Taiwan. So I think we had an obligation.
Dana Lewis :They'll keep going, and I tend to think, just like you do, that Putin will not be finished or satisfied. Oh, absolutely.
Malcolm Davis:Yeah, he's got much bigger plans than Ukraine and I think that if he does win in Ukraine in, say, late 25 or early 26, then he'll be emboldened to rebuild military capacity as fast as possible and then confront NATO directly in the latter half of this decade, and once again that would be coordinated with China in a move against Taiwan. So I do think that we have an obligation to defend Ukraine and to ensure that it wins. The challenge for us in doing so is threading that strategic needle so that Ukraine wins and we at the same time deter Putin from reaching for tactical nuclear weapons. Because if Putin uses tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, nato are then obligated to respond at a conventional level and you end up in an escalatory cycle which we're all trying to avoid, it seems escalatory right now to me.
Malcolm Davis:Oh, it's escalatory, but it's the Russians that are escalating. Okay, what we're trying to avoid is that really big escalation of a Russian attack on a NATO state conventionally, or Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons. You know, for example, if Russia did use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine and we didn't respond, then that would embolden Putin even more to use more tactical nuclear weapons and it would send the message not only to the Russians but also to the Chinese, to the North Koreans, to the Iranians, that use of tactical nuclear weapons is okay. So that would change the game for international security in a major way. So we're between the rock and the hard place there if we're presented with that scenario, and that's why I'm saying we do have to step up in terms of our deterrence posture to make sure that the Russians do not use tactical nuclear weapons under any circumstances.
Dana Lewis :And yet you heard Zelensky announced this week that they have new weapons. They appear to have the reporting from bloggers and the press inside Ukraine, as it sounds like they have ballistic missiles that can hit Moscow. Can you imagine what is going to happen and frankly I can't, because I don't know where it's going to go after that If a ballistic missile hits the Kremlin or starts exploding on some target inside Moscow? There have been drone attacks before, but they weren't very significant, but a ballistic missile actually hits someone, a building, a government building, kills someone. I mean, where does that go after that?
Malcolm Davis:I mean, that is a big step, but you know, to put that into context, the Russians just launched a massive attack with large numbers of ballistic missiles on keep. So I do think that the Ukrainians are justified in developing this capability and using it. Ukrainians are justified in developing this capability and using it, and I do think they're justified in using it, given that the Biden administration is quite illogically refusing to let them use ATAKOMs against targets deep inside Russia. So you know, yes, the Ukrainians do have this new ballistic missile. They will certainly use it, I'm sure. And you know, a ballistic missile will have much more payload capacity than a drone, so it could create a lot more damage.
Malcolm Davis:And then it's really up to the Russians on how they respond to that, and they've got a number of choices. They can launch massive attacks on Kiev and other Ukrainian cities, like they've been doing in the last few days, try to inflict as much damage as possible, or they can reach for the tactical nukes. And if they reach for the tactical nukes, then they know that NATO must respond conventionally. And then they're in an entirely new war. And are they prepared to go down that path, knowing that the risk of escalation into a strategic nuclear exchange is very real? I'm not sure. So I think that I once again support Ukraine in launching attacks against Russia, including with this ballistic missile on Moscow, if necessary. But NATO has to do its bit and step up and deter Russia from using tactical nuclear weapons in response.
Dana Lewis :I mean, that's the big gamble and I was going to ask you why is the Biden administration, do you think, still stalling on supplying the necessary weapons, or at least lifting the restrictions on the weapons that they have already supplied to the Ukrainians, to allow them to hit these air bases or these S-300s or any of the aircraft that are launching these glide bombs? I mean, there was another 90 drone attacks overnight. The night before there were another 90 some odd or almost 100, you know rocket and drone attacks, 200 earlier in the week. I mean, the number of attacks on Ukraine this week alone has been head spinning.
Malcolm Davis:Yeah, look, I mean I think the Biden administration is terrified of the prospect of escalation to use of nuclear weapons or the prospect of Russia retaliating directly against NATO. That's the two scenarios. That keeps Biden and his national security advisor and his secretary of state and secretary of defense awake at night, because what they don't want to do is get sucked into a war directly with Russia, because they know where that leads. But at the same time, if they don't allow Ukraine to win and Russia ultimately prevails and wins in, say, late 25 or 26, that's exactly where they end up in the end, because Russia will then threaten NATO. So you know Biden does need to understand that. You know it's important for Ukraine to win, because if Ukraine wins at the same time as NATO firmly and effectively deters Russia from using nuclear weapons, then it's checkmate for Russia and we defeat that threat once and for all.
Malcolm Davis:Obviously, coming out of that scenario, the US and NATO have to stand firm along their eastern frontier indefinitely. They face that Russian threat so long as the Putin regime is in power. The challenge there, of course, is they also face a threat in the Indo-Pacific, with China against Taiwan, and that demands that the US and its allies, both in Europe and also in the Indo-Pacific step up, increase defence spending and go to a pre-war period mindset and paradigm in terms of boosting defence industrial capacity so that they're ready to deter it. If that deterrence fails, they're ready to fight. And I'm not convinced at this point in time that Western democracies have got themselves into that right frame of mind yet.
Dana Lewis :And the last question to you and I appreciate your time is that, because not everybody buys this argument that this is a larger war, it is not the Russia-Ukraine war that this is a real struggle. I don't want to say democracies against autocracies, I don't want to say democracies against autocracies, but it is, you know, the European liberal order, the Western liberal order, fighting back Putin, who has essentially declared war on them. And not everybody buys that larger global argument that Putin's just going to keep coming. A lot of people think it could just stop in Ukraine and, you know, push for a ceasefire, try to do something that they did like with the two Koreas and wait for Putin to push on. He's getting older and why bring this to a full confrontation right now?
Malcolm Davis:Well, firstly, they should be thinking in terms of a global confrontation between authoritarian states and liberal democracies, because that's exactly what we're seeing. What you are seeing is countries like China, russia, north Korea and Iran working together as authoritarian states to confront Western democracies, to end a rules-based international order that is led by Western democracies, to end democracy as a form of governance and to create an authoritarian world order for the 21st century. That's exactly what is happening. We're in this global conflict now. It's very different from the last global conflict, be it the Cold War or the Second World War, but nevertheless, the potential for that global conflict to end up in a hot global conflict be it the Cold War or the Second World War, but nevertheless the potential for that global conflict to end up in a hot global war a World War III, if you like is quite real, I think. Second point is that many people are terrified of the prospect of nuclear war, or escalation in that sense, and so they don't want to take the hard decisions, to stand firm, and they don't believe yet, in spite of Putin invading Ukraine in 2022 and Xi Jinping continually threatening Taiwan, they don't believe that authoritarian states actually will use force to achieve their geopolitical aims to achieve their geopolitical aims.
Malcolm Davis:And I think that we've been lulled into this lazy strategic timidity since the end of the Cold War, where we are not prepared to confront the possibility of world war or major power war or nuclear war.
Malcolm Davis:And we need to get our heads out of that sort of strategic timidity mindset and into recognising that post-Cold War interregnum that existed from 1991 through to about, probably, 2014 is over and we need to start thinking about an entirely new, much more dangerous strategic environment where we are once again confronted by authoritarian states in the same way that we were in the late 1930s, and Hal Brands has written some excellent analysis in this regard, where he directly compares the events now that are occurring this year and in previous years with the late 1930s, and the parallels are quite apt.
Malcolm Davis:So I do think it's really important for western democracies to realize the fight that we're in, to recognize that it simply won't go away, that, even if putin eventually dies, that the person replaces him will be far worse, because, believe me, there are no pro-western reformers in the queue to basically lead Russia. And that Xi Jinping is determined to impose unification on Taiwan, even through the use of force, because he's got so much politically invested in that goal. So you know, this is the fight that we're in and we have to be ready for it, and I think that we have little choice.
Dana Lewis :I hope you're wrong, malcolm Davis, but I think you're probably right, and so I appreciate your, your, your perspective, and it's late at night in Australia, and thank you so much.
Malcolm Davis:It's my pleasure, always happy to help out.
Dana Lewis :Anthony Constantini is a conservative writer for the American Conservative, a conservative magazine. He received a degree in arms control and strategic studies. Anthony, nice to meet you.
Anthony Constantini:Thank you very much. Just to clarify I'm a contributor for American Conservative. I'm not formally employed by them.
Dana Lewis :Cool. So let's just talk about what's happening on the ground in Ukraine right now. More drones overnight, close to a hundred. The night before, you know, there were a combination of rockets and drones, and the night before that and the night before that, there are hundreds. This week it seems like it is escalating right now, not de-escalating in any way.
Anthony Constantini:Yeah, no, I would say that that's certainly true. I think that a couple of weeks ago you saw a decent amount of even very, very pro-Ukrainian voices in the West starting to say maybe we need to have some more negotiations, a little bit more, and I think that there was an argument that the war could have been maybe drawn to some sort of long-term pause. But I think that recent events have kind of shunted that off to the side for the time being.
Dana Lewis :You've written that you don't think Ukraine can win in the East and that Russia is not going to be pushed out of the areas it's invaded and annexed. Is that fair?
Anthony Constantini:Yeah, that's a fair way to phrase what I've said. Yes, why do you think so? I think it's just a matter of what Ukraine can bring to the table versus what Russia can. In the very beginning of the war, I wrote that Ukraine should not jump to negotiations, that they should have pushed as hard as they could, especially after their fantastic Kharkiv counteroffensive in late 2022. But it's become increasingly clear that Ukraine is, simply put, running out of men and running out of the capabilities to pursue a really long-term war, which would result in them getting back Crimea, getting back the east, and whereas Russia simply has a large amount of individuals, it can just kind of throw into the fire.
Anthony Constantini:I can go into these rural villages where people have no real political power outside of Moscow, outside of St Petersburg, and just pull as many people as they need.
Anthony Constantini:They have the money and, more than anything else, they have the time. So what would you say about the wisdom of Zelensky and his generals launching this offensive inside Russia, in Kursk? But the problem is, whenever you engage in some sort of military action, especially like this, there has to be a clear end goal, and to me, the end goals either don't seem to exist or don't seem feasible. The Ukrainian government has put forward that they're going to use Kursk as a bargaining chip, which seems reasonable on the surface, but when you look at the fact that I mean, you had Prokhorin get into Moscow, obelisk just last year, and Putin was relatively unaffected, the idea that he's going to run screaming to the negotiating table saying fine, fine, take whatever you want, give me Kursk back, I just find it unrealistic. I lived in Voronezh for about a year, which is a city 500 kilometers south of Moscow, and they had a joke there which is there?
Anthony Constantini:were a lot of American students there by the way, right, yeah, there was a language program there, and they had this joke for decades, which was they're all in the Kremlin, gathered together, and they say, okay, the time for talk has passed, we need to bomb the West. And so one of them says, well, let's bomb London. And somebody says, oh no, my money's there. One of them says, let's just carpet bomb France, and they say, oh well, I have a villa there. And they keep going on and on and on. And then somebody says, well, what about Vronish? And no one in the Kremlin has anything to do with Vronish, so they bomb there.
Anthony Constantini:And, in the same way, kursk is not some city that is crucially do everything he can to just to get this back, especially when the biggest area taken so far is I think its hand was about six thousand inhabitants. And so what it seems to me is that putin is annoyed, obviously, and probably embarrassed, because this is objectively embarrassing, but he'll throw people at it, he'll wait. Eventually ukraine will get pushed out of that, and then, at the end of this incursion, they won won't have taken any of Russia's land. Russia will have slowly chipped away in the south, as they're currently doing, and Ukraine will be worse off. They'll have less men, they'll have less armaments and potentially, if the United States government has changed next year, they may have a much less supportive American government. I can't see a way that this will work out in a positive way for Ukraine.
Dana Lewis :So let's talk about that possible government that is led by, you know, conservatives and President Trump, possibly. You know he's saying he wants to end the war right away and he wants to stop spending money and, and, uh, he wants to end american support. Europe may continue to to fight on and in their supply to ukraine and I I don't know how that will work out and whether they've got the necessary muscle. A lot of people don't think that they they'll be able to keep ukraine going for very long without american support. But what is the consensus, if you can even speak from that perspective in conservative circles right now? On long term, do you just give Putin what he wanted? You let him bite off a huge piece of Ukraine. In exchange for what and what price does he pay? And what is the deterrent in the future for him not going after Lithuania or Estonia or, you know, the Baltics, or Poland, and on and on?
Anthony Constantini:now in conservative policy circles. I think that if Harris were to win, there are enough Republican senators who would vote to pass more Ukraine aid. The Speaker of the House, should he be speaker next year, he's already made clear he would continue to support aid. But, that said, there is a kind of loose consensus forming that the post-Cold War order that the United States did uphold is something that no longer needs to be upheld, and I think that when people and it's a fair question when people say, well, what price should Putin pay? What happens if Lithuania, estonia, come next Is a lot of, especially when it comes to national conservatives, who are starkly different from what can be called fusionist conservatives or kind of bush conservative predecessors, is that they don't really see it through that lens. Um, putin is not that popular in the republican party. When you look at polls, he's almost as unpopular as he is in in the democrats. Um, he has. I think the last poll I saw showed his approval rating something like 7% in the Republican Party and 6% for the Democrats.
Dana Lewis :Yeah, Do they actually poll and ask people how popular they think?
Anthony Constantini:The amount of polls that people ask Americans to give their approval? Why, on?
Dana Lewis :earth. Would we be polling people, asking Americans what do they think of the Russian leader? I mean, is he in some popularity contest inside the Republican Party?
Anthony Constantini:Well, it's a fair question. I mean, those numbers came from Pew. I believe I could double check that it was Pew or Gallup. But they usually ask questions like that pretty regularly, at least in the US. But this is all to say that at the same time, it's not necessarily a respect for a newfound respect for Russia that is causing them to say we don't really.
Dana Lewis :I don't want to say that they don't care, but you might be right if you did say that you might be right.
Anthony Constantini:There's more of a sense of and I don't mean to just simply restate Trump's slogans, but a sense of putting whatever would result in helping America first. And so what that would mean is it would be sad and I'm speaking from their perspective, from the perspective of what would likely be an incoming administration it would be sad if the Baltics were attacked. But the Baltics are not our responsibility. The Baltics is Europe's responsibility and the EU's. Take Albert Golby, who's likely going to be Trump's national security advisor. He's made this point again and again that Europe has a fantastic weapons industry. They have 400 and something like 50 million people in the European Union. They have, with France, nuclear weapons, if you include the United Kingdom, two nuclear weapon states.
Anthony Constantini:There's a sense that the United States simply does not need to take care of, for example, countries like Eastern Europe, that Europe can take care of Eastern Europe, and so it's not necessarily a question of well, should Putin pay this price, at least coming from this perspective of a new Republican administration? But why would we bother making him pay one when he didn't really go after us? He went after an order that we no longer care about, is the thinking. If they wanted to uphold this order, then sure that kind of conversation would be held. How do we make him pay for this? But they don't really care about upholding that world order anymore. They think that it was detrimental to American interests.
Dana Lewis :May as well give China Taiwan then.
Anthony Constantini:Well, that's the thing.
Dana Lewis :The argument is that you have to May as well, give North Korea.
Anthony Constantini:South Korea. Well, if you uphold American interests, then you don't.
Dana Lewis :I'm saying, if you follow.
Anthony Constantini:No, no sure. But the thing is, if you uphold American interests, then you don't have to have a kind of one-size-fits-all there. You can say well, it would help America's interests to keep China from breaking out of the first island chain, so we need to keep them out of Taiwan, but it doesn't really matter to us if Russia's territory moves a bit into Ukraine's. At least that's where this thinking comes from. That kind of one size fits all you absolutely cannot do this anywhere on the planet has kind of fallen by the wayside, and a lot of that is due to the fact that we never really upheld that thinking. At the same time, the Bush administration was pushing the Bush doctrine of democratization. They were best buddies with Saudi Arabia, who executes people for being gay, and there was a sense of look, if we're going to be hypocritical anyway, why don't we at least be hypocritical in US interests? And so that's kind of what's really driven the party in that direction.
Dana Lewis :And so that's kind of what's really driven the party in that direction. Or, you know, post-cold War thinking anymore and just give Russia the Baltics or whatever they want. You know I shudder, but it's interesting. And you think that that is a majority in the Trump circle, in the Republican Party? I mean, it's certainly not in the Senate, I think.
Anthony Constantini:but no, it's definitely not a majority of the Senate Republican caucus. And, to be clear, I'm not saying that they're saying give it to Russia. But what they're saying is, europe has the capability to defend itself and it clearly just does not want to. And that's something I would myself agree with is that I think Europe has gotten very, very comfortable spending a lot of money on social services but then having the Americans kind of come and spend money on defense. And what I think a lot of European leaders are worried about in the back of their heads is that if America leaves, they're going to have to either increase taxes on an already overtaxed tax base or cut social services, and I think that that is panicking them. But you're already seeing this happen, for example, in Germany, where you have the government effectively saying we're not going to give Ukraine any more money because we don't have it, which obviously they do, but they just don't want to spend it.
Anthony Constantini:And so there is this frustration that Europe is simply really just refusing to pick up the ball. I mean, you had I think it was last year or two years ago Brussels tried to make this big deal about a new defense spending fund, which sounded great until you saw that it was $1.5 billion, which, for a military defense spending fund, is kind of a drop in the bucket. I think had Europe been less resistant to Barack Obama's push to raise defense spending 10 years ago, I don't think you would have this kind of um call it distaste coming from the republican party toward europe now. But they were very resistant, with barack obama saying, hey, could you please do this. They were extremely resistant with trump, much more aggressively, saying you need to do this you're talking about the two 2.5 percent of gdp for nato membership yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, I'd say that.
Anthony Constantini:And even when Obama was trying to push them to sanction.
Dana Lewis :By the way, these are trade partners, these are cultural partners, these are close allies. Right, I mean, I would agree you didn't step up with the money. See you later. It's not a Trump negotiating position, although a lot of people think that's what it was You're saying. There's actually a real core belief that you know, to hell with Europe.
Anthony Constantini:I think the problem is had Europe, for example, in over the last 30 years? And nobody expected them to do this? We, the United States, did not ask them to do this and perhaps that's that's America's mistake. If Europe had said we are part of the West, we are all the West and we love where we came from, we love cultural traditions, you know that would be one thing. But I think that Republicans, especially today, see a Europe that is not saying that but is still expecting America to uphold its end of this bargain.
Anthony Constantini:And I think and I can speak from personal experience, the amount of times I've heard you completely selfish Americans, you don't want to help us, but then also, ha ha, you don't spend any money on your own health care. Wow, this is just so pathetic. And every time America says we are going to take some troops out and we do want to spend money on our health care, it gets to selfish again built up and just it's. It's just kind of frustrated enough. Republicans, at this point it's not a majority in the senate. Um, I think if donald trump was president, he would likely be able to sustain um to you know, sustain a veto um, if he had, if he it'd be, veto some large ukraine aid package. Um, but if he's not president, those aid packages are likely still going to keep rolling anthony costantini uh, nice to meet you and and pleasure to get some of your perspective.
Dana Lewis :It's a bit jarring to hear somebody say it, but it's not the first time I've read it or understood that. There are people that hold those views so, and they are probably gaining some ground within the Republican Party. As this war plays out in Ukraine and people say, okay, the counter offensive didn't work, we're pumping billions in there. At what point do we stop? At what point do we get the fighting stopped and focus more on American needs back home? And that debate's happening a lot and it's naive to pretend it isn't so. Thank you so much. No, yeah, likewise, hans Peter Midtjian is a former Norwegian Navy commander and he was posted to NATO. Former Norwegian Navy commander and he was posted to NATO and, among others, he was in Ukraine as a naval attaché for Norway and he regularly has been back in Kiev. In fact, he was there just a couple of weeks ago. Welcome, pete.
Hans Petter Midttun:Thank you, Donna. It's a pleasure meeting you.
Dana Lewis :Look, you've written a pretty compelling piece and that's why I wanted to interview you on why the restrictions on Ukraine need to be lifted, and it's really part of a growing chorus from some very credible people on why the West has to allow Ukraine to hit further into Russia with Western weapons than it is now. Can we just talk about that? Because in this week when Ukraine has been pummeled with hundreds of drones and missiles and bombs, it is especially poignant right now.
Hans Petter Midttun:Well, absolutely, and I've been arguing in favour of this for quite a long time. While the limitations to the use of Western weapons is more something of a new year date, from my perspective, this has been a part of a border confrontation for such a long time. This is not only a question about Ukraine's right to defend itself according to international law, but also about its ability to defend us, europe and the West, and I find it very odd that we, by supporting Ukraine, simultaneously impose restrictions to what it can and cannot do according to international law. I mean, the UN Charter allows Ukraine to defend itself, for that there is no question whatsoever. But by imposing limitations to what targets legal targets ukraine can do, we we sort of put infringements on how we interpret, uh you um, international law. I, I find it's uh do you really?
Dana Lewis :because I, I, I don't if, if I'm able to jump in here because we have um. We've spent generations trying to avoid war with Russia and the Soviet Union. Before that, we have spent incredible amounts of efforts in arms control agreements, on steering clear of a conflict that could draw the world into a nuclear exchange. So why would it surprise you then that the US administration and others are so hesitant to allow weapons that they're providing to Ukraine to be used in an offensive matter inside Russian territory? And I know what I'm telling you is not news to you and I'm sure you've given it lots of thought.
Hans Petter Midttun:Well, it actually. It takes you straight down to this discussion about escalation or the fear of escalation, and there's several layers to that, and one of them is that the one of the most important battle space on this war, and there's six domains the most important of those domains is the fight in the cognitive space, this fight for the mind, and Russia has used these 10 and a half years to impose a fear in the West, being afraid of exactly what you say, this fear of escalation, fear of this turning into a border confrontation and a nuclear war, end of days, armageddon, absolutely. But the point is that the fear of escalation defies logic in a sense. First of all, we have to recognize the fact that, in respect to what we have done, in respect of our policy, russia has chosen still to turn peace into war. They've chosen to escalate. We have to recognize that at the moment, or for actually the last decade, russia has controlled or managed escalation, while we have kept safe distance. The only way you can actually manage escalation is that you self-escalate to de-escalate, and we haven't done that. But still that has not stopped Russia from doing what it has done, starting a full-scale war in Ukraine or in Europe, if you like.
Hans Petter Midttun:The other part of it is and it goes a little bit to the heart of this discussion about the fight and the battle on the cognitive space. Many don't really understand Russia. They see diplomatic measures, negotiations, political talks as a sign of weakness. They only accept or respond to strength, to strength, and what we fear will provoke them is actually the opposite they are provoked by our weakness, but the fact that we have not responded to their provocation for more than 17 years, since 2007. And lastly, if there was something to this aspect of escalation, well, ukraine has crossed the red lines so many times that we should have seen that escalation a long time ago.
Dana Lewis :Even we, the West, have crossed inner circle to take more serious action, whether that be attacking the transportation lines that are moving Western equipment into Ukraine from places like Poland. And so it's not that you know there were red lines. We crossed the red lines, and that's that you know. We called them on their bluff and now let Ukraine do whatever the hell they want. I mean, in fact, there's still a danger there, and those red lines are not static.
Hans Petter Midttun:No, they're not static, but we also have to put into consideration the realities on the battlefield, if you like. You know the fight in the battlefield, which consists of nuclear threats or threat of escalation, or World War III, or whatever we call it. It has no match. It doesn't link up to the realities. Firstly, it doesn't match the Russian doctrines. It does not match the military capabilities and the ability to explore these opportunities. It does not match the fallout of such an action. Only such a thing like the threat of mutual destruction is a part of the thing they need to assess before they actually go to this step of escalating. They need to consider their relationship to their international partners, and so forth. I know it's not full, but I'm saying there's more arguments in this favor than in favor of escalation. The main point is still, though, is, irrespective of what we have done, russia has chosen to escalate, and it still escalates, and the only way you can get into that OODA loop or in the decision loop is to yourself be willing to take that risk.
Dana Lewis :So is the Kursk invasion by Ukraine a necessary escalation. Is it a wise thing that Zelensky has ordered his army to do?
Hans Petter Midttun:For me. I've written an article on escalation and the red lines and to me this is just another clear proof that the Russian threat of escalation does not. The red lines does not exist as such. I think it's smart because it shows to the Russian public that the war is coming home. Putin cannot protect Russia from the fallout of the war. It undermines his regime.
Dana Lewis :But it's also important for us because it's so much easier to support uh one on a battlefield who succeeds and not, you know, withdrawing as we know I'm puzzled by it, because at the same time that zolensky has done this um, the russians are advancing in the east and it looks like some of those battle lines are not collapsing, but they're certainly being pushed back. Ukraine is losing ground, so they're siphoning away some of their muscle from the eastern front line to go into Kursk, hoping to somehow influence Russian public opinion, but we're not seeing the Russians take the bait. Really are we? They continue to push in the east and taking more villages and more settlements and they are not, for the moment, rushing to take back Kursk at any cost.
Hans Petter Midttun:No, they do not. But this is not an on-off switch and I think a lot of people would expect something to change immediately, and I don't think that was ever to be expected. The reality is that Ukraine has, by its action, stretched the front line. It's forced Russia to reconsider the disposition of its forces. It forces Russia to build up, relocate forces not only in Kursk, but along the whole international border to Ukraine.
Dana Lewis :Belgorod as well.
Hans Petter Midttun:So the long-term effect of this will be far-reaching. So I agree that Russia is sort of digging in, trying their best. We've seen a higher number of clashes the last week than we've seen in ages, but that's you know, as autumn is setting in and things will eventually stop time, it's just a matter of time. Ukraine has forced Russia to use its reserves in Kursk, so its ability to sustain the temple that will be a fall in the next upcoming weeks.
Dana Lewis :Sorry, just to clarify you believe, not the Ukraine temple, but the Russian temple will falter, you believe?
Hans Petter Midttun:It will falter in the weeks to come. No doubt about it, Can you?
Dana Lewis :you know, there's a bit of a mirage here, right In the daily news cycle, where we we don't tend to explain things very well because we're running from story to story to, you know, headline to headline, and where we say well, you know, a bunch more missiles were fired overnight, a bunch more areas were, were, were hit by those missiles. Um, another electrical grid, uh, a building for Ukrainians died, and I don't mean to minimize this, but five Ukrainians, three Ukrainians, people get lost in that. How would you characterize what's happened in this past week? I mean, it is really unprecedented to have 200 rockets and missiles and these glide bombs launched in one night and then 90 the next night. I mean, russia's really turning up the heat here yes, I know I'm going to be done.
Hans Petter Midttun:We have a short memory span, I think. Now, when this war, full scale war, started two and a half years ago, russia launched between 200 and 300 missiles a day. So this, this is not extraordinary. It's extraordinary because we haven't seen it for two and a half years, if you like. But this happened before and you might argue that it's triggered by the Kursk incursion. Because it needs to demonstrate that it still has banks, still the ability to hit. But we will also see. We have seen from the statistics that Russia has not the ability to sustain this kind of attack. It will falter even at this stage. But it needs to demonstrate to the Russian public that they still have this ability to hurt Ukraine.
Dana Lewis :How are they hurting them? I mean, as a military person, you know very well if I shoot at you, if I fire it, you know I think somebody used the the analogy yesterday if I fire the arrow, um, you're not just going to intercept the arrow, you're coming after the archer. So why is ukraine unable? What does the archer look like? Where are they? What, um? And why is ukraine unable to stop it?
Hans Petter Midttun:well? Well, it takes us straight back, in a sense, to the discussion about the western imposed limitations, but it also a discussion about what kind of support have we provided? You fail? So just to provide you a bit of statistics, of statistics. Since the full-scale war started, russia has launched something reaching about 9,700 missiles at Ukraine, about 14,200 drones. It's an immense number. On top of that, they are increased. Last year especially, they increased the use of guided glide bombs against Ukraine. Today, there are about 3,000, 3,500 glide bombs dropped every month.
Dana Lewis :These are massive. These are not just 500-pound bombs, which are scary enough, these are massive.
Hans Petter Midttun:It is absolutely massive and what we're seeing is these bombs alone. They are together with artillery and amylase. They are raising ukrainian cities and villages to the ground, massive destructions. But we also seen that from the drones and and missiles that they have caused massive destruction by themselves they lost. Ukraine has lost like half of its energy capacity 9 gigawatts lost this year by Russian strikes and we are at a stage where one fears that some region of Ukraine will be. People cannot live there during the frost period, when it reaches minus 20 to 30 degrees in the worst case. So the damage to Ukraine and the destruction of Ukraine is massive.
Hans Petter Midttun:I mean, we're talking about like nearly $500 billion in cost of rebuilding Ukraine after the war, rebuilding Ukraine after the war. Now, the reason I am not able to stop this is that most of the, the majority of these missiles like 45, at least close to 45% of the missiles they're launched within reach of Western provided weapons. We're talking about Iskander, the, the north korean ballistic missiles. We're also talking about sorry, you're saying within reach or or beyond within which, yeah, um, they reach.
Hans Petter Midttun:you know, outside is the range of the hymas, but inside the range of systems like, uh, a snowstorm or the attack camps. We're talking about more than 4,000 missiles launched, where they have managed to down about 81 of them. Just have a taste of that. It's minuscule One missile shot down Intercept. More than 4,000.
Dana Lewis :Yeah, that's minuscule numbers right.
Hans Petter Midttun:Incredible shot down in intercept. Yeah, that's minuscule numbers, right, incredible. And the reason for that is there's only one set of air defense system capable of stopping them today, and that's patriot. Ukraine has urgently and repeatedly asked for up to 25 systems. Batteries, um, that have reduced the numbers, recognizing that they will not be given 25, ask for at least a minimum 7 to 11, and we're not even close to that number, and the consequence is, as we see, ukrainian cities and villages and infrastructure are being devastated. So we not only provide them with the systems they need to defend themselves, but we don't allow them to hit the launches before the missiles are launched, and I find that highly immoral.
Dana Lewis :So the the Archer um looks like what. These are air bases that are flying aircraft. These are our artillery um artillery and rocket launch platforms. These are ships at sea in the Black Sea. These are also air launch bombers that are coming long range further away from the Ukrainian border and they're able to launch without even entering or coming close to Ukrainian airspace.
Hans Petter Midttun:True, there's a wide range of them, but if you see the statistics, the one they are struggling with, that is the one launched close to the border. From the ballistic missiles, they're downing about 4.5% of them. On the missiles which have a ballistic trajectory, like S-300, s-400, used in secondary mode, they're downing 0.6% hardly nothing.
Dana Lewis :And they are close to the Ukrainian border. The gloves were taken off and the US administration and others said okay, you can fire into Russia, which they have done on a limited basis, like some 19% of the area but if they give Ukraine the full right to go after those S-300s, for example, would Ukraine be able to hit them?
Hans Petter Midttun:Well, it all goes down to intelligence, of course, the real-time situational awareness but they have.
Hans Petter Midttun:Ukraine has a far better intelligence and situational awareness than Russia have, not only because of its own capabilities, but also because of the support from the West, of course, and we've seen that in other strikes that they've only been enabled by a fantastic intelligence.
Hans Petter Midttun:They reach fine targets. I'm not saying it's going to be easy, because they are mobile. You need to sort of find that on the way, you need to track them and you need to hit them while they are setting up to launch and that's a very, very small time given At least you have that opportunity you threaten Russian capabilities and you force Russia to rethink their strategy. We've seen that works already. I mean, there's 16 airfields within range of the attack camps and Russia has moved their airplanes, the fighter jets, from them and to their field to avoid something they, russia, thought would be in force already a long time ago. You know the permission to strike them, so they already launched some of their capabilities to their field. Yeah, but we should not lose track of all those other targets left behind, which is all within range of the Western provided weapons.
Dana Lewis :Let me ask you two things, because I know time is short. The president of Ukraine, zelensky, said yesterday that they have a new weapon. There's a lot of speculation about what he's talking about, probably some kind of longer range missile, high speed ballistic, high-speed ballistic that could hit Moscow. Do you think that? If that's in the cards, does that take us to a new level of conflict?
Hans Petter Midttun:I think it's been in the cards for a long time, to be honest. I mean, we have seen Ukraine striking targets at the range more than 1,800 kilometers. They have slowly, over the last year and a half, expanded their capability to attack targets in the depth. What Slenskine mentioned just days ago was two things. First is a new missile Slant drone with a fuel, bar by bar, bar turbine jets with a far longer range of other capabilities, better capabilities than the rather simple drones that are sending in these days. And the second system is ballistics. Yesterday, I think, I noticed that they have launched or successfully completed the development of new ballistic missile, which means it will have an even greater impact on Russia. Now a ballistic trajectory is so much more difficult to stop than anything else. Ukraine expanding its ability to wage war in Russia and denying Russia the ability to continue its war in Ukraine, irrespective of Western support. I think it's a result of the lack of Western support. Anyone who knows Ukraine knows that they will never, ever give up in the face of russian repercussion.
Dana Lewis :They're fighting for their existence and they will use whatever means available for them to defeat russia do you think all this talk of talk, um in negotiation, um, there's a lot of politics in there, but the idea that ukraine is suddenly gonna sit down at the table with Russia and allow Russia to, you know, bite off a chunk of the East, that Zelensky would give that kind of ground, or the Ukrainian public would probably not allow him to after this much time. Or do you think they're getting tired?
Hans Petter Midttun:To be honest, there's no doubt that Ukraine starts being tired. It's just to start with that, because two and a half years of war had a huge impact and you notice, I've seen that, depending on what time of the year I'm there, you can see that people are getting tired, but there's no way Ukraine will give away any bit of territory. The reason for that is they realise, recognise that this war is essential for Russia. They know that Russia, having done what it has done, having played its card, it's demonstrated for the world their imperial ambitions, if you like. They know that if they accept negotiation, accept a peace agreement, they know that it will be temporary. They have made more than 200 talks and 20 ceasefires during the eight years leading up to the full-scale war From 2014?.
Hans Petter Midttun:Yeah from 2014 to 2022. They only saw that turning into a full-scale war because Russia started the war in 2014. They intend to see through. They intend to defeat Ukraine 1914, they intend to see through. They intend to defeat Ukraine and they intend to defeat Ukraine to do the next step.
Dana Lewis :Okay. So the next step then and that's my final question to you, and I might have a supplementary in there and that is that you've written articles and criticism saying don't call it the Russia-Ukraine war, and criticism saying don't call it the Russia-Ukraine war. That badly bends reality. Why do you say that?
Hans Petter Midttun:I'm a little bit frustrated by the term, to be honest. I think it's highly misleading. We sort of belittle a war that is so much bigger. We discussed that even when I was defense officer with my colleagues at the time. We recognized that, based on Russian doctrines, its statements, its narrative, its disinformation, its actions, this is a much broader war and you don't have to take my word for it. I mean the European Union.
Hans Petter Midttun:The EU parliament, in September 2021, put out extremely well-prepared documents discussing the European Union and its member states and concluded that Russia is waging a hybrid war against the European Union and its member states. It's documented in its action across the United States and Europe, everything from sabotage to liquidations, to terror. There's a long list of Russian aggression already taking place. This is already a much broader confrontation and what's happening in the West is exactly what happened in Ukraine from 2014 to 2022. It's exactly the same war. It's worth mentioning and actually it's crucial to recognize that Russia has not defined Ukraine as its enemy. It's actually explicitly said that Ukraine is not its enemy. It has said the West, the Western democracies, are just that. So the fact is, in its doctrine, it's in its actions, in its statements, everything is done. It's related to NATO, the US and Europe, but we have belittled the war because it's so much easier to discuss and find solutions to a small war than what the reality is. Absolutely, it's a war for dummies.
Dana Lewis :That's why Trump says he can end it within a week of his presidency if he's back in the White House.
Hans Petter Midttun:It has had that and it's absolutely misleading. But, that said, I'm not too impressed by how President Biden goes about solving this war either. There's one key message I think people need to understand. If you go back to 24 February and the time after, you heard all heads of state saying that this is a Russia-Ukraine war. Ukraine is not a member of NATO and therefore is not eligible for NATO collective defence. All perfectly true. The only problem with this is none of them mention NATO's core essential task number two. Core essential task number two, that is, crisis management. Crisis management is, to use a picture, is when you see there's a fire in the, your neighbor's house and you decide to go, how to put it out before it increases in intensity and spreads to your. That's crisis management and a native study concept until june 2022. After the first world war started said, in case of war or conflicts which threaten the security of the alliance, the alliance will use a mix of political and military tools to stop it.
Dana Lewis :That war we're seeing today is exactly that war, but no one NATO nor Biden nor any heads of states talk about that core, essential task crisis management, supporting the freedom of Ukraine and stopping Russia from advancing further, and bolstering NATO forces in the Baltics and elsewhere ready if Russia wants to take another step, whether they've done that effectively or not there's a lot of people would debate that.
Hans Petter Midttun:Well, it's not even open to debate, to be honest, because before Russia decided to do the full-scale invasion 24th of February 22, they did 17 years of violation of the international law. They did 17 years of testing. As a result, and they concluded that we were not up to doing what was our strategic ambition to do crisis management. Before they attacked, they must have considered the opportunity that NATO would intervene, because that was the ambition of NATO. They concluded that NATO would not do that and by doing that, they actually proven that NATO deterrence do not work, that they've actually proven that NATO deterrence do not work. We are fighting an uphill battle to convince Russia that when we say that we intend to defend every inch of the NATO territory, that they believe us. At the moment, I don't think they believe us Because the actions.
Dana Lewis :That's a dangerous. That's a dangerous, extremely dangerous.
Hans Petter Midttun:It's extremely dangerous.
Dana Lewis :Hans, you're a former Norwegian Navy commander, I think. Once a commander always a danger, extremely dangerous. It's extremely dangerous. Hans, you're a mid-toon, a former Norwegian Navy commander, I think. Once a commander, always a commander, former naval attaché for Norway to, among other places, including NATO and Ukraine. Thank you so much for your thoughts and time, sir. I appreciate it.
Hans Petter Midttun:Thank you so much for having me. It was great talking to you, Dan.
Dana Lewis :And that's our backstory for this week. No-transcript.
