Bagram air base looted? Taliban fighters rapidly taking 1/3 of Afghanistan from Government troops now in retreat, and some estimates suggest Afghanistan could erupt into full civil war with the Taliban retaking power in 6 months.
On this Back Story Dana Lewis who has reported from Afghanistan since 2001, talks to former Canadian Ambassador Chris Alexander who points the finger of blame at Pakistan.
And former U.S. Air Force Commander at Bagram Retired Major General Walter Givhan, on the question can the Afghan army hold ground with a small Afghan Airforce he helped train.
Bagram air base looted? Taliban fighters rapidly taking 1/3 of Afghanistan from Government troops now in retreat, and some estimates suggest Afghanistan could erupt into full civil war with the Taliban retaking power in 6 months.
On this Back Story Dana Lewis who has reported from Afghanistan since 2001, talks to former Canadian Ambassador Chris Alexander who points the finger of blame at Pakistan.
And former U.S. Air Force Commander at Bagram Retired Major General Walter Givhan, on the question can the Afghan army hold ground with a small Afghan Airforce he helped train.
Every Taliban unit that comes into Afghanistan comes from Pakistan. They all have a command links to Shura members used to be called the[inaudible]. There are now various Schurz with regional names. Quit them here. I'm Shaw, the shower that are in Pakistan. And when those shirts sit down, I know from having spoken to Taliban commanders, there is an ISI, there is a Pakistani army officer in the room. Usually the person giving the orders, saying what priorities are to be addressed next.
Speaker 2:Hi everyone. And welcome to another edition of backstory. I'm Dana Lewis. I was based in Moscow for NBC when the twin towers and the Pentagon were attacked by Al-Qaeda. And that meant I was the closest network news reporter to up Dennis Stan. I hitched a ride with the Taliban's arch enemy, the Northern Alliance out of Duchenne bay Tajikistan and landed in Northern Afghanistan and a resupply gun run. As they called it short on food, sitting on boxes of ammunition in one of the first correspondents to winter, the country as America started its bombing campaign. I have been in and out of Afghanistan, a few dozen times embedded with us troops over the years. It pains me. The country is sliding back now towards Taliban rule as the American Biden administration cuts and runs after so much effort to stand up an independent government on this backstory, a former Canadian ambassador to have Genis Stan, Chris Alexander. He has remarkable insight on the country and its neighbor Pakistan and major general Walter give on who ran us air operations at Bagram air base. We flew together in a Russian helicopter with a former Soviet Afghan pilot who was being retrained by the us air force to resupply and support the new FDA.
Speaker 3:All right, Chris Alexander served for 18 years as a Canadian diplomat, including as the first resident Canadian ambassador in Afghanistan. And he also in 2011, published a book called Afghanistan's quest for peace. Um, the title is actually the long way back, Chris. So forgive me for that. Uh, back is probably the key word right now, as in going backwards very quickly.
Speaker 1:Would you agree? Yeah, I totally agree. And I chose that title deliberately because, uh, I was hopeful 10 years ago that Afghanistan could achieve stability and peace, but we were already taking the long way that goal because we weren't dealing with the fundamental issue, which was Pakistan sponsorship of the Taliban and their allies. And since my book came out, we thought for a lot of gold who wrote a book called the wrong war, just literally about how we should have been taking Pakistan to task rather than fighting the Taliban. Only on Afghanistan's territory. Steve Cole came out with directorate S which starts to profile the institution in Pakistan's intelligence community that runs the war in Afghanistan, but 10 years have elapsed Dana and no one has done anything politically to address this issue. 10 years
Speaker 3:Was elapsed since your book, but 20 years has elapsed since and 20 and 20 years since nine 11. Exactly. The Americans did say that at certain point, you know, they, they wagged their fingers at Pakistan. They threatened to withhold funding. They pressured Pakistan on enforcing the border and stopping the Taliban from crossing over. So, but, but let's give you the benefit of the doubt on all of that, that they didn't really directly deal with it. And there is no evidence that they did. So the question is, why didn't they, why couldn't they take Pakistan on?
Speaker 1:Well, the classic statement of that, uh, of that reasoning comes from Joe Biden himself, who famously said, I think Steve Cole quotes, this others have quoted it. Uh, Pakistan is 10 times, seven to 10 times, bigger by population than Afghanistan. Pakistan is a much more important country than Afghanistan. Uh, and the implication coming from him is we don't really care about you, little Afghanistan. We want our strategic relationship with Pakistan, uh, nuclear, uh, de facto nuclear weapons state to continue. Moreover us forces were using Pakistan, uh, as their logistics hub as their, uh, the, the, the, the, the territory over which goods that came by sea were, were moved to, to supply the operation. I've got a stat, so paradoxically,
Speaker 3:But yeah, there were definitely air bases in there that they were moving goods in and out. It was
Speaker 1:Kilogram for kilogram time, for time. It was the most important staging area for us supplies, all heavy equipment, um, came in that way, uh, oil fuel, uh, and, and other supplies came that way. Many of us thought they should be lessening seeing the strategic quandary on the horizon, thought that they should be lessening their strategic reliance on Pakistan, but the decision was made not to, uh,
Speaker 3:It's ridiculous, right? You're, you're, you're fighting an enemy that is taking safe Haven in Pakistan, the Taliban in the frontier areas, but with a wink and a nod, you're still using Pakistani territory as your staging base for American forces were being attacked by the enemy from that area. I mean, it just doesn't get any stranger. It's
Speaker 1:Not only strange it's, um, it's, it's unprecedented in its, uh, I mean, in the 19th century, when the British engaged in policies like this, you called it perfectly, right. It was not an honorable position. It was not a principal position. It was something, uh, duplicitous and, uh, ultimately dangerous. But I don't think we've seen certainly not in the 21st century or anytime recently, a major country, a superpower backing two sides in a conflict in which not, not just two sides of the conflict, but two sides. One of which included his own soldiers mean the U S lost over 2000 service men and women in Afghanistan. And arguably the, the main belligerent causing their deaths, uh, was a state that George Bush called a major non NATO ally. Uh, I mean, that is not just incoherence informed Bulla suit. That's dangerous, uh, hypocrisy,
Speaker 3:You said arguably because the Americans would say, yes, the ISI Pakistani intelligence was playing in Afghanistan. They were duplicitous one moment, you know, saying that they were going to help the Afghan government, the other moment, pulling the rug out and helping the Taliban. And, and, uh, um, but, but some would say that you overstate the ISI or Pakistan's role, uh, in, in the Taliban's resistance war, if you want to call it that. And I, that's probably an unfair term.
Speaker 1:Sure. And these are the people who are causing Afghanistan. It's new agony. Uh, the denialists the people who argue that Pakistan isn't playing this principal role are the ones prolonging this role. This war, there is absolutely no evidence for their, uh, for, for the case they're making, uh, every Taliban unit that comes into Afghanistan comes from Pakistan. They all have, uh, command links to Shura members used to be called the Roxbury. Sure. Uh, there are now various Schurz with regional names, Quinta, Mirum, Shaw, the shower that are in Pakistan. And when those sures sit down, I know from having spoken to Taliban commanders, there is an ISI, there is a Pakistani army officer in the room. Usually the person giving the orders, saying what priorities are to be addressed next. Now, the people who are claiming that the ISI has no rule are the ones who haven't studied this carefully, who haven't spoken to the victims, who haven't spoken to the combatants. And it's,
Speaker 3:We were deputy head of the UN though. You were, you have a Canadian ambassador there, you for sure. Had conversations with the Pakistanis. What do you recall? What was the most direct conversation you ever had with a Pakistani official and what, how did they respond?
Speaker 1:Pakistani officials? Uh, especially the ones in uniform, in, in their moments of greatest self satisfaction and hubris would acknowledge fully what they were doing. Uh, they would never do it on camera. They would never do it on the record. Uh, I don't have recordings of these things because that's not the way you operate as a diplomat. Uh, but they fully acknowledged that the Taliban were their guys, that they had taught them the art of suicide bombing, that they had maintained the pressure because the us was distracted in Iraq and that they fully expected the U S to leave, uh, and their, and their team to take over. Do they
Speaker 3:Want to bring down the Afghan government and replace it with what the long-term
Speaker 1:Goal? Absolutely. And here's where we are incoherent inconsistent and a little bit tragically. Ridiculous. At the same time, we have sanctioned Russia under Putin, uh, backwards and forwards should do more, but we've done quite a lot for a small invasion relative to what's happening in Afghanistan of Crimea and Don best, maybe 10, 12,000 people have died since 2014 in that conflict. Most countries have sanctioned Iran for its various proxy wars from Iraq to Lebanon, to Syria, to Yemen at Pakistan is waging a much larger proxy war. One that has killed our soldiers over two decades. One that threatens to, uh, plunge Afghanistan into a new phase of civil war and no one listed lifts a finger. Uh, how, how are we ever going to claim to be upholders of international peace and security? The principles of the charter. If, if after a 20 year NATO mission mandated by the UN, we still can't do anything to stop the main belligerent from destroying the country. What is the
Speaker 3:Goal, Chris? I mean, the Taliban back to do
Speaker 1:What the goal is to get Pakistan, to change its policy, to pay the
Speaker 3:Price Pakistan, I meant what are they trying to accomplish by pulling the rug out on the Afghan government, having the countries, you know, splinter again into different factional militias, and they don't see it that way power to get.
Speaker 1:What if, if they have someone on top of a hill of bone of bones and skulls in Kabul, it won't matter to because it will be their person. Their policy is to be top dog in cobble because they think anyone chosen by the Afghan people or as it as was the case back in 2001, uh, the international community under UN auspices is going to be wise to their tricks and hostile to their interests. And indeed they think anyone not chosen by them in a Cabo will be listening to India more than to, uh, Islam about. And I mean, look at it from their perspective cars. I was educated in India. His father was killed by the ISI Ashraf Ghani, uh, got his PhD in Denmark and was an American citizen, uh, for a good part of his life. He, he, he also, um, has no time for this destructive proxy war that Pakistan has been waging for 43 years. They want someone there who will behave like more like, uh, a provincial drop, but provincial governor, uh, and take orders from not from Islam, but from well pin rebel. Pindi where general headquarters is based.
Speaker 3:There are no more than 124, um, areas that have been taken over by the Taliban. They control now, roughly a third of the country by different estimates. Do you think that the Afghan army has done, or do you think taking some of those regional centers is one thing, but when you start moving on the bigger cities, uh, including Kabul that in fact, the, the Afghan army may surprise us. And after all of this training and all of this money that they may actually stand up and hold ground and push the Taliban back.
Speaker 1:Yes. I think the Afghan army and Afghans themselves, um, have the capacity to fight. Uh, they will have the motivation to protect their communities, their families, their property, uh, because they've seen this movie before, back to 1996, 2001, there are two, uh, wildcards for them. One is resupply of basic, uh, inputs for war fighting from fuel to ammunition, to, uh, vehicles, uh, and helicopters to give them mobility. And the other is air power. Uh, if the U S really fails to support the Afghan national air force, um, and denies Afghanistan, air power from central command, which has been available for 20 years, then Afghan forces could fold very quickly. But I, I hope that cooler heads will prevail in Washington and that step won't be taken. Uh, and even by the most, um, optimistic maximalist estimates of how many Taliban there are in the field, they don't have remotely enough people to, um, attack take and hold the entire country. I mean, look, uh, how, how little, uh, relatively speaking NATO ICF was able to do, even at the height of the surge with over a hundred thousand troops in country that pushed back the insurgency in the south, but it didn't read Afghanistan of the Taliban. I don't think you will ever see a Taliban force in Afghanistan with remotely like those capabilities or, or, or that scale as a fighting force. Uh, and so this is going to be a stalemate and a civil war, and if it continues and if Pakistan doesn't change course, and that's why there are voices prominent voices today in Pakistan, despite threats to freedom, to journalists, despite threats to politicians who were jailed and murdered, uh, almost every week in that country, there are people expressing grave doubts about what the chief of the army staff is doing, because it's his policy. This is not something that's been voted on in parliament or debated, uh, in, in the bazaars of Lahore. This is, this is something that is being imposed, um, because it's, they've always done it. And that is also a holdover from the colonial policy of the British. So we're talking about a legacy of history here that is difficult to undo, but it has to be undone because 43 years is far too much for any country to endure, uh, an unending war. Uh, and the, the, the, the behavior of the policy of the, of the Pakistani army is the absolute height of irresponsibility.
Speaker 3:And the tragedy is though, um, that Biden wants to turn his back on it. Trump wanted to do the same. The American appetite for staying in Afghanistan is evaporated, unless there's another attack on America. And, you know, a lot of people say Taliban, the Taliban's ties to Al-Qaeda are certainly still in place. Um, so, you know, here we go,
Speaker 1:There are many voices in the United States that think this is the wrong move. Uh, there are many who will be reminding Joe Biden that his predecessor as a democratic president, Barack Obama pulled the last troops out of Iraq in 2011, but they went back in 2014 because of the vacuum that created because of the horrors of ISIS. These will be new horrors that a us president won't be able to ignore appeasement, turning away, uh, indulging the, the, the, the negative emotions of isolationism. We've seen that all before. We've seen that in the twenties and thirties, we S we saw that in the seventies when there was a lot of drift in American foreign policy and hypocrisy and American foreign policy. Uh, we saw that again under Clinton, and again, under Obama, we saw terrible moves made under Trump and Bush, including the invasion of Iraq sooner or later, you have to do the right thing. And Afghanistan is not a marginal country. It is central to south Asia to Southwest Asia, and it has been a focus for investment by the whole world for 20 years. Uh, there are a lot of people around the world in almost every country who think that legacy is worth protecting and not abandoning
Speaker 3:And American foreign policy was accurate, but not very, um, flattering. So, and not very promising probably, but Chris Alexander, the former Canadian ambassador to, to, uh, cobble who I've known since your days in Moscow, when you were attached to the embassy there, it's always great to have your insight. It's a privilege to talk to you. Thank you so much.
Speaker 1:Thank you, Dana. Thanks for doing this.
Speaker 3:Yes. From Troy, Alabama, his major general retired Walter Devonne, uh who's who led the effort to rebuild the Afghan air force, his commanding general of the combined air power transition force, uh, and he's commanded a combat training squadron and operations group and air base wing and air expeditionary wing, and was at the air force Institute of technology. And I first met you Walter. Hello? Yes. At Bagram air air base, which is making a bit of news right now. Uh, I
Speaker 4:Was, I was, uh, listening in, uh, uh, yesterday about the early departure from Bodrum. Yeah.
Speaker 3:And I think the, you know, in fairness to the Biden administration, they have denied that they didn't do a handover, but whatever handover it was, you know, it, it doesn't appear to have been a smooth running as it, as it could have. And there was looting of Bagram airbase by some of the people on the edge of the base. Does that break your heart in a way, given all of the efforts of American soldiers and from the army to the air force to stand up that base and use it as an integral platform for bringing what people hoped would be peace to Afghanistan?
Speaker 1:Yeah, it
Speaker 4:Is. It, it really does hurt, uh, from someone who spent a year there and invested a lot of, uh, energy and time and effort into to really building it. And I, I believe very much in our efforts in Afghanistan. So to see, you know, a very abrupt departure from a place like that and to, um, you know, some of our, uh, w uh, I don't know exactly what happened, but let's, let's agree that a lot of our allies there felt like they weren't brought into the loop, or, you know, that it wasn't an orderly a departure for, for, for whatever reason
Speaker 3:In that. Nice. You, when did you rotate out a gun out of Afghanistan?
Speaker 4:I, I left Afghanistan and, uh, uh, uh, step late September, 2009, I was there September, 2008, September, 2000.
Speaker 3:And even then you knew it was inevitable that the Afghan army would have to stand up on its own. And you were helping the Afghan air force because that's a hell of a big country and air force to train and be able to deploy and be able to service the army and also be able to carry out a tax if it had to.
Speaker 1:Yeah. You know, it's, you
Speaker 4:Look at Afghanistan and it really begs for air power, and some people scratch their head. They say, well, what, what do you mean by that? And I said, well, look at, if nothing else look at it from a mobility perspective, you've got a large country with very poor infrastructure, as far as roads and rail are concerned, you're going to have to get around by air. And that kind of a ability to maneuver in the air, uh, is absolutely integral to an effective fighting force. And we were trying to stand that capability up, uh, for the Afghans, uh, because, and w frankly, we had started that effort sort of late after, you know, we'd actually, uh, uh, established our security presence there. So it was, we were really playing catch up. Well,
Speaker 3:I mean, there was some hesitancy in turning over too much firepower to it, to, to, uh, uh, the Afghan government, which nobody was sure was, uh, was going to be able to, to, to hold, uh, hold the ground and, and be a real government. Was, was there not, I mean, how much, how much power did you place in their hands? You didn't turn them over F sixteens at that point. And when I was there, I was hoping you would arrange for me to get up. And one of those eight, 10 tank killers or something romantic. But in fact, you put me in an Mia helicopter, which is what you had armed the Afghan air force with to really be able to, to carry out troop deployments and resupply missions.
Speaker 4:Yeah. I needed him in the fight. We needed them in the fight then. So the quickest way to get them in the fight was give them the equipment that they knew, which in this case was Russian, uh, in my 17, which is the same as the Mia, just an advanced variation of that. The hip,
Speaker 3:I didn't feel very advanced. The one I was in,
Speaker 4:No, no, no, it's a little bit, a little bit different, a little bit more powerful engines in the MII 17 than the Mia, but basic the same airframe really. Uh, and then the[inaudible] Hines, the attack helicopters, uh, you know, that was the basis of it. You know, of course the, the issue that we ultimately ran into, even as we did, that was the political one of what you're buying Russian helicopters. Well, of course that's the quickest way to get them into the fight there, but ultimately there was a, there has been in recent years have transitioned to some us platforms, uh, to augment that. So they've actually got a fairly significant air capability right now that problem is going to be maintaining it. Yeah, let's talk
Speaker 3:About that. But I mean, in fact, a lot of those Russian helicopters were brought out of places like Kazakhstan and, and, you know, the money didn't go to the Russian government. They probably went to, you know, independent states in the stands, you know, it was Becca, Stan, Kazakhstan, whatever. Sure.
Speaker 4:Initially we were, we were getting, uh, helicopters and refurbishing them. We were getting them from various countries, but we ultimately had a deal with the Russians and the Russians were, uh, we had an exemption from the sanctions that were, uh, uh, in place at that time. And we were able to actually buy directly from the Russians. We did a pretty large purchase,
Speaker 3:Different, a very different president Putin then because he allowed air corridors over his country with the us forces to bring large transport planes over, over Russia at that time, right. NATO aircraft. Right. It was,
Speaker 4:It was a very different time. And of course, as we got into later with, uh, what happened in, uh, Ukraine, um, you know, it really became really untenable to, to continue the, the effort directly with the Russians.
Speaker 3:So what kind of aircraft does the Afghan air force have right now? Because we're talking about, can they hold the ground that is quickly disappearing from the Taliban?
Speaker 4:Well, they've got quite a variety of, of aircraft on the helicopter side that we were talking about. They still have some of the EMI seventeens, uh, am I 35, but they started getting EWH sixties, Blackhawks a us helicopter. So they've got a significant presence of Blackhawks. Uh, two of the aircraft that, uh, I started the procurement effort for that they got now is they've got the, uh, Cessna 2, 2 0 8, the caravan, uh, which we had had very good luck in Iraq with, with the Iraqi air force, uh, and the, uh, 8 29 super Tucano, which is a single engine turboprop, uh, kind of a classic counterinsurgency close air support aircraft armed with, uh, it'll carry a lot of, uh, different armaments, uh, you know, uh, guns bombs, uh, you know, that, that sort of thing, but primarily a bomb dropper, uh, but a great aircraft and a proven close air support, uh, platform, uh, that we were, uh, very happy that, uh, ultimately we were able to procure for them.
Speaker 3:Do you think the Afghan air force and the army can stand up without American firepower, that they can hold ground and they can take the fight to the enemy properly?
Speaker 4:Um, you know, that's really the question, isn't it. And I think we're gonna, we're gonna see the, I think, uh, I think that will in certain areas, uh, the it's large country, so it's hard to cover and already I was just, uh, looking at the air force. They're having a very high OPTEMPO right now. It's hard with all the demands, uh, for their, uh, support. It's really hard for them to keep this going. And of course, what I was talking about, the thing that people often don't think about the maintenance and the logistics that sustains this is also, that's a, you know, a little bit, uh, uh, tenuous,
Speaker 3:Especially what you're saying is really important because even the us current administration extended the term of the contractors in Afghanistan right now, because they feel that the Afghans can not service those aircraft and cannot, they're not at the level that they can, they can carry that on and they need American support. Yes,
Speaker 4:They do. And, um, and they're going to require that for a while, that, that, that is going to be absolutely critical to, to them. Uh, you know, at the same time, uh, the Afghans have an incredible resilience and resourcefulness, uh, you know, when I came in there, they had kept aircraft flying that, you know, you just wouldn't think you could keep it flying. I mean, they were down here in the Southern part of the United States. We call shade tree mechanics, you know, they're the person who really knows how to get something done. It may not be, you know, the book way, but they can get it going. So I think it feels a resourcefulness there, but at the same time, they're gonna have to have that supply line. They're going to have to have, uh, uh, that expertise. And I'm also hoping, uh, that, you know, we will augment their air power with American air power, uh, as we can, uh, wherever that we deploy would deploy that from, uh, out of, uh, theater or out of country, uh, to try to assist them as well. Um, I think that's going to be key to, uh, sustaining, uh, what they're doing there. Well, do you
Speaker 3:Think it's a mistake that we are leaving of Denniston so quickly and that there are some projections that the civil war could an unfolded lightning speed and, and that the country could, the Taliban could be back in charge there in six months. I mean, I don't think it's, I don't think the advances that rapid, but it is very rough. It is
Speaker 4:Very rare, but it does give one concern. And that's why, you know, when I spoke about that American airpower, you know, frankly, by him personally, I would love to have seen us sustain a small, uh, presence there too. I feel like special operations forces in conjunction with, uh, uh, Afghans, uh, and, uh, American air power and Afghan air power could really be a difference maker, uh, there, and in terms of holding things up, my hope was always that we could stand up enough Afghan capability, that it would require very little, uh, us capability, uh, augmenting them. And that there would be the political capital to sustain that us presence. Uh, you know, we weren't, uh, losing, uh, lots of people or have lots of people in, in invested in there. Um, and so, yeah, I'm, I'm, I'm a little sad to see us pulling back and concerned to see us pulling back this fast
Speaker 3:Shade tree mechanics is this shade tree pose.
Speaker 4:Well, it's, I, you know, I understand the, you know, this, this process has been going for a while now, the current administration of course inherited the, the, the peace deal and the talks and that sort of thing. It's, it's always it's passed from what I've seen it go through. You know, obviously America's longest wars it's been called, it's gone through so many administrations. I knew that we needed to get to a point and we've always needed to get to a point where this would sustain at a very minimal level of us support and that we hoped that we could build that capability, uh, so that it would, um, so I I'm, I'm, I'm concerned that, you know, we not just say, okay, that's it training wheels off no more us support. And I know we haven't said that that's dramatic, but I, you know, my heart goes out to pretty close to it. Yeah. Yeah. My heart goes out to, to them. Uh, you know, I loved Afghanan people and, um, developed a lot of good relationships there and a lot of admiration for them. And what they've been through. Can
Speaker 3:I ask, I mean, you were a major general, and I know the air force does a lot more than just answer the bell from the army to support. I mean, you're in there on strategy and planning and logistics and
Speaker 1:Simple question, who
Speaker 3:Was the enemy, who is the enemy? And were you fighting in surgeons called the Taliban, or were you really fighting Pakistan?
Speaker 4:Well, you know, it's, it's difficult. And I think the pack Sam part of this has made it as hard as anything, you know, they have a safe Haven to have essentially a logistical base, um, you know, where you can regroup and then come back across, who knows how many well, you know, we're part of that I used to, and I still track this. You look at the percentage of the Afghan population that supports, uh, you know, the Taliban and it's, it's really, it's always been a very small percentage. Um, and so, uh, the Pakistan part of this equation and how they were able to leverage that and, and how we get lost in the, okay, Pakistan using this as a hedge of strategic, uh, hedge against India and their presence, um, you know, that has made this as hard as, as anything is not having full, uh, uh, cooperation and control over that presence, uh, in Pakistan. Why didn't we confront Pakistan? Oh, I think we did. Uh, the question was always, how far could we push them? I mean, I've, I've, you know, been fascinated by the history of this whole thing from the beginning and, and, uh, you know, you can see us pushing, you can say, you know, sort of the Pakistan playing both sides and many times here, um, eh, you know, what was, could we have gone further? What, and how much further could we have gone? You know, it's, it's hindsight now, but, uh, it was maddening to have that base, uh, and that, uh, refuge in Pakistan, uh, you know, that was always going to be, uh, supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Speaker 3:Is this another Iraq? Do you think we're going to leave the, the Taliban are going to come back into certain areas. I don't know how many areas and their ties to Al Qaeda. Um, there, there are different reads on help from those links are, but I mean, there's a very good chance that the very reason we went into Afghanistan after nine 11 in the first place to, to get rid of a launchpad for terrorism, that that could start to return and very quickly, do you think we're going to have to go back into Afghanistan if we completely leave right now and abandon the Afghan government? Well,
Speaker 4:I think we have to be ready to absolutely because we, you know, we can't tolerate the same situation occurring again, uh, uh, that, that, uh, Al-Qaeda or other groups, uh, would have, uh, a base there, uh, from which they could launch. So that's, that's, that's not a tenable situation, uh, for us. And so, uh, again, as we keep thinking about this, that has to be in our minds, as well as, you know, the, the Taliban and, and what, what they're doing in Afghanistan, just to, to take over the power. The other thing I would say, though, you know, having studied the history of Afghanistan fairly closely, there is a resilience that will surprise people because there's, a lot of people are just writing us off saying the Taliban will sweep across again. But if you look at the period after the Soviet withdrawal and how long nausea Bula lasted after that, and the groups that, you know, had various power bases here and there, uh, my concern is that we will, the situation will deteriorate into, you know, one of these multicentric, uh, civil war sort of situations with all these groups vying for power and the people of Afghanistan losing in the process. As people try to bargain or dark, uh, take ground, uh, move against one another. Uh, it really has potential to be, um, you know, a humanitarian catastrophe, uh, for the people of Afghanistan as well. So I think we're going to really have to watch it. And our intervention could be many sorts. It could be an armed intervention. It could be a humanitarian intervention, I don't know, but we better be ready for everything, but
Speaker 3:Then you would like us to come to that reality sooner than later. I mean, after all of that time invested in the Afghan government and training up an Afghan army better to intervene sooner than later when there's nothing left.
Speaker 4:Absolutely. No, we need to, we need to be thinking through, and I know people are already, what are those trigger points and what, what do we do at those times so that we don't allow it to devolve into something that is, uh, uh, almost, uh, an irretrievable catastrophe that that will require even, even more, uh, investment in than it would at this point. That's one of the things that I always thought is that, you know, we, at various times, we could have argued about the level of investment in the search. My, my concern was that we, again, preserve that political will and capital to sustain a presence that could keep the Afghan government going and secure the country, at least to a point that they could continue to, to, to develop and that we would forestall any, uh, groups, uh, be it to Al Qaeda, Islamic state, any of these that, that might, uh, threaten us,
Speaker 3:Made you general Walter Devon. Great to talk to you, sir. Good to talk to you, Dana. Thank you.
Speaker 2:And that's our backstory on Afghanistan. Let's hope the Afghan government can hold its ground. The Afghan army can stand up to the Taliban and the Biden administration in Washington. Doesn't completely turn its back on what NATO countries for blood in billions of dollars into creating an independent Afghan democracy. I'm Dana Lewis. Thanks for listening. I'm starting a summer break. I will continue to bring you podcasts, but I may miss a week or two over the summer. Don't forget to sign up to our newsletter. Dana Lewis dot sub stack.com. Stay loyal to backstory and share the podcast. I'm Dana Lewis and I'll talk to you again soon.