Did Russia just mortgage the Kremlin to China?
At a 2 day summit in Moscow, Chinese leader Xi and Russian President Putin spoke of their close friendship.
Russia isolated by international sanctions because of it's bloody invasion of Ukraine, now counts on China to buy it's oil and gas and possibly provide lethal military aid.
On this Back Story Host Dana Lewis talks to U.S. Ambassador Douglas Lute, on attempts by China and Russia to upend the World order.
And Security and Russia expert Debra Cagan on Russia's nuclear threat, and how she likens China to the mafia, and the price of protecting Russia.
Did Russia just mortgage the Kremlin to China?
At a 2 day summit in Moscow, Chinese leader Xi and Russian President Putin spoke of their close friendship.
Russia isolated by international sanctions because of it's bloody invasion of Ukraine, now counts on China to buy it's oil and gas and possibly provide lethal military aid.
On this Back Story Host Dana Lewis talks to U.S. Ambassador Douglas Lute, on attempts by China and Russia to upend the World order.
And Security and Russia expert Debra Cagan on Russia's nuclear threat, and how she likens China to the mafia, and the price of protecting Russia.
For Russia. Russia has always been much more destructive everywhere they've gone. I mean, my view is China would like to turn Taiwan into the Chipmaker for the world, and China would like to turn Hong Kong into its own Wall Street. It doesn't wanna flatten them because then it has no benefit for China. Russia just destroys, and they don't care about what happens from that. So they have two different approaches.
Speaker 2:But look, there are ways to, there are ways to make Crimea potentially untenable for Russian control without invading it, right? Without sending tanks across the causeway and, you know, into Crimea itself. And you can do that with long range precision fires, rocket fires, missile fires, and so forth. You can do it by way of air support.
Speaker 3:Hi everyone, and welcome to another edition of backstory. I'm Dana Lewis. On this backstory, the new partnership announced by Chinese leader, she and Russian President Putin. Lots of rhetoric about a historic marriage between Russia and China as Putin needed support more than ever. Days after the International Criminal Court in the Hague labeled him a war criminal. What was this Russia summit all about? Russia wanted lethal military aid to succeed in its stalled war in Ukraine. It likely didn't get that, but no one knows for sure. But China is buying everything. Russia has to sell oil and gas. More coal has Putin sold his country to China. On this backstory, we speak to US Ambassador Douglas Loot, who says Ukraine will put the squeeze on Crimea in a coming counter offensive. And Russia's security expert, Deborah Kagan, who doesn't think Russia's nuclear saber rattling should make anyone blame Ambassador Douglas Loot is a retired, uh, US Army Lieutenant General, and he served as the United States permanent representative to from 2013 to 2017. Welcome, Mr. Ambassador.
Speaker 2:That's good to be with you.
Speaker 3:Look, I, I, I want to talk to you about a lot of different things, but I, I am completely distracted and it sends a shiver up my spine to some degree to watch the theater, uh, which is taking place in Moscow right now between President Xi of China and President Putin of Russia. Um, this is much more, it seems to me, and I want to ask you, than just some trade meeting. It seems, it, it seems momentous. It seems like we're watching a, a huge shift in part of the world, uh, that wants to undermine the West and try to shift the, the, the polar, uh, powers that be if, if, if I can say it that way. And how would you characterize it?
Speaker 2:Well, I agree. The visit itself seems to have, uh, seems to be a threshold, uh, threshold event in the sense that in the last year, the first year of the, of the, uh, the war in Ukraine, uh, president Xi has focused increas, uh, focused mostly domestically, right in, in, in the runup to the party Congress in the fall, uh, and his, uh, being recommissioned, uh, for yet another term, uh, as the leader of the C CCP and so forth. So, and during that year, the first year of the invasion, China under, she provided sort of rhetorical and political support, uh, for Moscow, but little more. Uh, and I think part of that, uh, is because of this sort of internal focus that she had over the last year. Uh, but now with that next term of leadership secure, uh, he has looked outward. Uh, and it's, it's interesting that one of the very first trips, perhaps the first trip that he made after Covid, um, and after being reelected, uh, was to Moscow. And now you see the theater, the choreography, the, the, the dramatics of, uh, his visit to Moscow. And what's ing about this is that I, he seems to be edging beyond rhetorical and political support towards perhaps material support, uh, to Russia. And that's, that I think is a serious threshold that we have to wash very carefully. This, this support might come in the form of military support. There are early reports of sort of small arms and so forth, finding their way from China, uh, to, uh, Russia in support of the war. Yeah.
Speaker 3:But more than that, the New York Times, sir, is reporting today that, uh, they sold 12 million in drones. I mean, this is the, this is airborne artillery,
Speaker 2:Right? Right. Or at least airborne observation, right? So, yes. Yeah. This, this is, this is serious. And I think we'll see in the coming weeks, days, perhaps in weeks, uh, the sort of refinement of these reports and see exactly what has been provided, uh, and whether this was done commercially, uh, through, uh, second and third channels and so forth to sort of mask the Chinese role, uh, or whether it was actually sponsored by the, the Chinese government. Of course, the differentiation, the distinction between Chinese government and Chinese industry is pretty murky, right? It's pretty tight. Those are pretty tight connections. Uh, but, but we'll see. It is true. However, I think, and the big point is the one you made by way of the question that she and Putin have common cause here. And the common interest, the common cause is that they both want to contest, uh, the, uh, what they view as the US dominance in the international architecture, the international system, uh, over the last 20 or 30 years. Uh, and they, uh, they, they think that together they can, um, they can, uh, effectively contest that, that US position. And
Speaker 3:Then, isn't it a mistake for President Biden to, and I don't wanna make this political within the us, but isn't this a mistake, whether it's Biden or anybody else that, that says, this is a struggle. Ukraine is a struggle between the autocracies, uh, and democracies and between the east and and the west. Doesn't that then push China into a corner where it says, we can't allow Russia, we cannot allow Russia to fail.
Speaker 2:So I believe that casting it as democracies versus autocracies is too narrow, uh, and too restrictive. And, and I prefer a broader cast, right? Which would be, it's a contest between those who believe in international rules of the road as, as embedded in the enshrined in the UN charter and subsequent, subsequent international agreements in Europe, the, uh, the, uh, uh, Vienna document and, and so forth. Uh, so those who abide by these and believe in these
Speaker 3:Rules. So, can I just translate that because I'm trying to, I I just, before you move forward with it, I just wanna understand the rules of the road. You mean kind of post World War ii, um, countries or countries and, and the, the, the big bully on the block and cannot go and take new territory and, and push over a border
Speaker 2:Exactly. With the two principle rules of the road as enshrined in the UN charter being territorial integrity. So a nation state's territory is its territory not to be taken by another, and national sovereignty, meaning that a nation decides on its own, uh, what courses it will take, which alliances it little join which economic, um, uh, and trade, uh, relationships that'll have and so forth. So those are the basics. Now, under those basics, there are thousand varieties of national government. Um, and I don't think we as Americans need to try to specify, uh, a form of democracy or even a form of government as long as, um, as long as we can agree that there are certain rules of the road. And I think it's actually that those, those basic, those fundamental rules that are being contested here, I mean, most obviously by, by the example of Russia invading a neighbor and seizing sovereign Ukrainian territory. And by the way, this didn't start a year ago in February of 2022. It began eight years before that in 2014 when Russia seized and then illegally annexed Crimea, a sovereign part of Ukraine. So the UN charter was violated first in 2014, and then just again, and repeated in a more violent, virulent way, uh, a year ago.
Speaker 3:So do you believe that that China and Russia buy into the philosophy of spheres of influence, and that they reject the, the US and the West platform of, you know, a, a a certain list of, of human rights and, uh, of trying to influence other countries internally? Where China would say what goes on in China is, is our business, Russia would say what goes on in Russia, and then now by extension in Ukraine, in its sphere of influence, shouldn't concern the West, or shouldn't concern, uh, in specifically America.
Speaker 2:I think the distinction, Dana, is that the rules of the road, as I read the UN charter says what goes on inside a country is that country's business is that country's, uh, prerogative. What goes on beyond that country's borders, however, uh, is governed by these international rules. And where, where Russia has crossed the line is when it crossed the line on the boundary of Ukrainian territory. So we should not, in my view, especially for Americans, given the last 20 years of experience, um, and have the ambition that we're gonna change internal politics of Russia, for example. Um, but rather, uh, we should expect Russia and, and the other 190 some members of the un chart of the un um, of the UN community, um, to abide by basic rules like you don't violate another's, another's territory. And look, it's not just spheres of influence. It goes beyond, I think, spheres of influence. In this case. It's, you know, it's military invasion, it's, it, it, and in fact, if you read, listen to Putin carefully, it's, it's an imperial model of, uh, international relations where one country can not only, um, uh, influence the affairs of a neighbor, it can actually dominate and occupy with military force the territory of that neighbor. That's, that's imperialism.
Speaker 3:What do you think happened to President Putin? I mean, I'm, I'm trying to understand it. I co I was there in, when Putin came to power from President Yeltsin in 2000, I've covered him for, for more than 20 years. I mean, there was a moment where he seemed to em embrace, he was even a member of the G eight. Um, he was even in the nato, uh, partnership for Peace program, if that was the, if, if I remember correctly, the title of it. I mean, he was western leading at, at leaning at one point. Um, what, what happened to the guy did, did, did, did Russia just not succeed and, and didn't diversify and didn't build like China did, and its industrial might, is it? And, and now he sees military means as kind of the only, only thing he's got left, and that's the only way that Russia can go forward. I mean, what, what's your theory?
Speaker 2:Well, well, look, my, my, my memory on this is similar to yours. You know, I remember the NATO led, uh, military intervention in Bosnia and in the US sector in Bosnia was a Russian brigade, a Russian air airborn.
Speaker 3:There was a bit of competition on the ground there when the Russians rolled into the airport, I think.
Speaker 2:Well, that was, that was Kosovo. That
Speaker 3:Was Kosovo. Sorry, you said bus
Speaker 2:Years later. But look, when I commanded US forces in Kosovo in 2002, I had a Russian battalion in my sector, uh, and they, you know, they came over for sports day and so forth. So, so we had not only sort of coexistence, but on the ground mil during military operations, we actually had cooperation. Now, it wasn't, it was, it wasn't the smoothest cooperation because we were of course, come both coming out of the experience of the Cold War mm-hmm.<affirmative>. Um, but, uh, I also remember later when I was the US Ambassador in, uh, at NATO that I had a Russian counterpart. I mean, Russia had a diplomatic mission assigned as a partner state, not as a member state, but as a partner state. And
Speaker 3:In fact,
Speaker 2:NATO headquarters,
Speaker 3:In fact, they carried out joint operations for anti terror training, for instance, off oil platform.
Speaker 2:Exactly. Right. So, and, and remember it was Vladimir Putin, who, who made the first phone call to George W. Bush after nine 11 expressing common cause support. Right? So, you're right. This is this version of Putin, and this version of Russia seems to have drifted a long way from the nineties and the early two thousands. And, and what happened to him? I, look, I, who knows, I think however it does fit a pattern. And the pattern is that the more centralized control in a nation state, the more autocratic, um, a uh, leader, the more isolated that leader. Uh, and, and with that isolation comes, comes a trend where loyalty of your staff and subordinates and advisors, uh, loyalty overwhelms competence, uh, and the, the dissenting voices tend to be muffled or, or simply silent, uh, because it's no longer
Speaker 3:Or dead or, or, or in jail.
Speaker 2:Yeah. Or, or, you know, disappearing and, and so forth. Yeah. So the more centralized, the more isolated, the more autocratic, um, the more I think prone to decisions like Putin's decision to, to invade, uh, Ukraine. And here, of course, there are at least three assumptions that were, that are, have proven in last year to be dramatically wrong. Right? I mean, he, he misread the capability of his own forces. Mm-hmm.<affirmative><affirmative>, he misread the, um, the virulence of the Ukrainian national cause and the desire by Ukraine to defend itself, and he misread the West in terms of cohesion and unity. Now, how do you get, how do you go over three on those key work? And my, my assumption is my, my my conclusion is he was isolated from the hard cold facts in a way that is dangerous. Uh, but that, that isolation of autocratic leaders is very typical.
Speaker 3:What, what is the world gonna look like, um, if China slowly gets pulled into this conflict, um, not boots on the ground pulled in, but begins to provide more and more aid du use aid that can be indeed lethal aid, things like drones. What's, what's the world start to look like as if this progresses with China getting deeper and deeper and supporting Russia militarily?
Speaker 2:Well, so if your premise is right, if China moves more obviously into material support for, um, especially material military support for Putin, uh, China will open itself to the sorts of economic consequences that Putin is suffering right now. And, uh, I think what's interesting about that is that China, of course, is much more intertwined with the global economy than Russia was before the invasion. And while Europe has Europe, one of the big surprises for me here is, is how quickly and nearly, completely in a one year's time, uh, Europe has, has weaned itself off of Russian energy. Um, but of course, the Russian supply of energy to Europe has been replaced now with Russian cheap Russian supply of energy to Asia, and in particular to China. Next year, there'll be a, there'll be a natural gas pipeline that's open between Russia and China. So, so, and
Speaker 3:In fact, in fact, China is now the, the largest R Russia is now the largest supplier to China, uh, of, of oil, uh, trumping, uh, Saudi Arabia. Right. And then I was looking at the figures last night, like, I mean, the EU trade with China's 828 billion, uh, US us trade with China is 690 billion. Uh, but Russia's growing. It's still small, but it's 190 billion.
Speaker 2:Yeah. So, so one thing you'll see, I think, is that those sorts of economic, right, the re-engineering of global trade and so forth will continue, um, and, and Russia and China will be more and more interlinked, um, with Russia dependent on those revenues from energy sales to, to China and, um, and in return receiving Chinese manufactured goods and so forth. Right? But, but look, in the course of this connection, Chinese Russian connection, uh, if it persists, China will face consequences, economic consequences, like those that Russia has faced. The challenge will be that it'll be tougher and tougher, I think, to maintain the cohesion of the Western response to Russia and the Western economic pressure on Russia. Uh, because in the case of China, we depend on Chinese goods in a way that we didn't depend on Russian goods. And we are much more intertwined in, in a global economy with China, uh, than we are, than we were with Russia. So it will be, it will be difficult. We'll pay a higher price to impose those economic consequences on China in this hypothetical that we're, we're discussing mm-hmm.<affirmative>, uh, and, uh, we paid than we are paying, uh, with regard to the consequences on Russia. So it's,
Speaker 3:That's a map of, that's a map of Ukraine behind you. And
Speaker 2:It is, yeah. It, when
Speaker 3:You, when you look at that map
Speaker 2:Data as an old army guy, right? You can't, you can't quite,
Speaker 3:You've gotta love maps.
Speaker 2:You can't understand it without a map. Yeah.
Speaker 3:Do you think, and or what do you make of the analysis that the only way that Ukraine can be successful in the counter offensive with Russia now is to, to, um, set the conditions for ceasefire talks on the ground, or, you know, peace talks or whatever we want to call them, but set the conditions on the ground, which means they're gonna have to sever the land bridge from Russia to Crimea, and they're probably gonna have to go for Crimea itself. Can you imagine the Ukrainians not doing that?
Speaker 2:I can't imagine President Zelensky or frankly, a successor, right? He's up for reelection next year, um, a in a democratically, a democratically, uh, ruled Ukraine settling for Ro any Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory. I mean, it's just hard to imagine. Um, so that means that Zelensky has understandably set maximalist objectives for his, his military effort. So it talks about every inch of Ukrainian territory. So not only that, which was violated and seized by Russia and occupied today, uh, over the last year, but rewinding the tape all the way back to 2014, which involves, as you're, as you suggest, Crimea, uh, Crimea itself, look, it Crimea is a much more difficult, uh, military objective than the Donbass. Um, and, and it's, it's obvious it's a peninsula, so there's only limited access across those that land bridge to Crimea. And that makes it a much more, um, a much more challenging, uh, military, military fight. But look, there are ways to, there are ways to make Crimea potentially untenable for Russian control without invading it, right? Without sending tanks across the causeway and, you know, into Crimea itself. And you could do that with long range precision fires, rocket fires, missile fires, and so forth. You can do it by way of air support, uh, air or, or, uh, air force, air power, uh, and so forth. And in particular here, I think the, the key military target on the Crimea Peninsula is the, is the home base of the Black Sea Fleet, the Russian Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol. And, and the issue there, of course, is that it's that same Black sea fleet that is based in Crimea arms itself, right? Then goes to sea, into international waters in the Black Sea, and fires these long range missiles that are devastating, uh, civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. So you have this peculiar arrangement right now, and I think untenable situation where sovereign Ukrainian territory, Ukraine, uh, Crimea is the base for Russian long-range strikes against mainland Ukraine. Uh, and, and so far Ukraine has been denied the capability to strike back and to deny those, those bases, those Russian bases in Crimea. And, and I think before we talk about retaking Crimea, a preliminary military step is to take the fight to those Russian bases in Crimea in a way that denies them sanctuary that they currently enjoy.
Speaker 3:Last question to you. Do you feel that it's, w w what do you think when you hear people like, uh, Florida Governor DeSantis say, this is not really America's fight, that this is a regional conflict and it's not an America's long-term interest, uh, to be involved?
Speaker 2:Yeah, I mean, I think it, it simply misreads the situation, and it goes back to where we started our conversation today, which is that this is a, this is a blatant, maybe the most blatant violation of international rules since, you know, perhaps World War ii. Um, and you could cite other historical cases, and that would lead to another podcast episode, right? Uh, but the point is, this is as blatant as it gets in terms of one nation seizing the territory, and now, you know, illegally trying to annex that territory as its own. Um, and we need to ask ourselves, is that the world we wanna live in? Is that the world that promotes American security, that promotes global stability, that in turn links to economic trade, which in turn links to American economic prosperity? Is that the world in which we wanna live? And I think the answer is no.
Speaker 3:The, the answer by some Americans may be, if it's over there, it's not my problem. Um, you know, and maybe it stops there, but people like, people like you, I suspect would tell them it, it doesn't stop there.
Speaker 2:Well, I think that's right. That's certainly true in my case. I don't believe that the distance alone here is, is, uh, provides America safety. It's the principle that's being violated, um, that is, uh, that's being fought
Speaker 3:Over. Investigator Douglas Lu. It's great to talk to you, sir, and, and it's been hard to get you, so I I, I appreciate it very much.
Speaker 2:Well, thanks, Dana. Good questions. And, uh, I enjoyed our talk.
Speaker 3:Debra Kagan worked as a, a career state department diplomat and defense department official from, uh, Reagan to Trump administrations, including senior director for European, Russian, and Eurasian security issues, said. Anyway, that's the official bio, but actually, in talking to Deborah and reading her, her bio, Deborah, you are extremely experienced both in the Middle East and in Russia. You participated in negotiating with the Russians and getting rid of nuclear materials. You have a, you have an incredible background, so thank you for joining me. It's, and it's, and it's an honor to talk to you.
Speaker 1:Thank you for having me.
Speaker 3:Let me first, if you don't mind, ask you about China and Russia, and watching these meetings over the last two days with President Xi and President Putin. From what we've seen of them, um, it sends a chill for me in some way, because I feel like, um, that something is being set in motion that this alliance between the two, um, is really against the, the West, um, is get, is getting stronger and gaining momentum. And, and it seems to be something that should be worrying, you know, all of us. Would you agree?
Speaker 1:Well, I, I, I wanna, uh, if I can push, uh, uh, go a little backwards here, the first I'd like to say is that China actually creates things. Russia creates nothing. And so they have different approaches to how to do this. China, China has its Belt and Road initiative, which I, as a Chicagoan compare to the mafia Kneecapping people sort of, we'll give you this money to do this. We know you can't ever repay us. And once you do
Speaker 3:That, well, once you take the money,
Speaker 1:Right, well, just appropriate,
Speaker 3:You owe me the property you owe us, right?
Speaker 1:Yeah. We're not gonna blow it up. We're just gonna take it from you. We're gonna own your port facility like they've done in Ethiopia and places in West Africa, et cetera. Yeah. So, uh, for Russia, Russia has always been much more destructive everywhere they've gone. I mean, my view is China would like to turn Taiwan into the Chipmaker for the world, and China would like to turn Hong Kong into its own Wall Street. It doesn't wanna flatten them, because then it has no benefit for China. Russia just destroys, and they don't care about what happens from that. So they have two different approaches. The second thing that I think, um, makes them less of an alliance that people think they are, is that China has a real problem with Putin's use of nuclear threats. Um, China is heavily dependent on its nuclear power status as being a threat to countries that would dare cross it. And if Russia were to use a tactical nuclear weapon, and the, and Armageddon did not ensue, that would undercut China's a nuclear deterrent strategy, it would undercut Iran, it would undercut India, Pakistan, and all these other countries in the global south who would sort of say, oh, um, the world did not come to an end because you used a dirty tactical weapon, which is what it would be. So I think there are some disagreements here. What would've been interesting, uh, the, to come out of this joint press conference is if China had made any decisions on supplying arms, serious arms and equipment to Russia. Um, now we do believe China's been supplying computer chips. Um, and we all know that modern militaries are chip dependent. Um, even a small jalon has 32 chips in it. So, uh, China has been helping Russia source the rear earth minerals as well as the components to deliver chips. So Russia's supply lines can keep producing weapons, and that to me is, as, as I, it's not as obvious, but it's as insidious as if they were providing the weapons themselves. But I, I don't, I don't read into this, this long-term alliance, because eventually their interests, their enlightened self-interests are going to part company, uh, in some places. And already some of this is clear in Central Asia, particularly in, um, Takistan and the, like.
Speaker 3:H how are they gonna part company in, in Taji? Well, and for instance, I mean, yeah, you feel that, that China will use Russia to a certain point and then push it aside because it wants to control those
Speaker 1:Areas. Yeah, I think, I think China, I mean, Russia's already seeded the, some of those borders to China. Um, it just doesn't have the manpower to, to have them as much as it would like. But I do think there was a reason why Russia for the first six to eight months of this war was not pulling some of its most sophisticated weapons that are kept in the far East into use in Ukraine. That's changing now, but it was a long time coming because I think Russia still saw China as a threat in the Pacific. And, uh, and not, I mean, we use this term that I don't like call, we call our enemy strategic competitors. I, I'm a big believer in semantics. They're your enemies, get over it, deal with it. They think you're their enemy, they get a vote, so let's deal with it. But Russia still sees China, um, as you know, as, as a, you know, more than an afma. It sees it as a, as an issue for its own, um, desires to be a Pacific power.
Speaker 3:And there are great fears within Russia and always have been that eventually China will take over the far east of Russia.
Speaker 1:There was a, uh, a Russian, in the days when Russian had a lot of five star generals. There was a Russian five star back in the nineties who, um, I I asked whether you would ever go to war with China. And he goes, on day one, we kill, you know, 50 million people on day two 70, a hundred million. And by day seven, he said on day seven they'd win, um, because they just have more manpower, uh, more strength, huge industrial complex. And it was, uh, very interesting that this five star wise in general, who had, you know, served many tours in many places in the world. Was that upfront about saying it?
Speaker 3:Talk to me about the nuclear thread, because I know you don't feel that Russia would push the button when it comes to Ukraine. And you know, this week even you have Dimitri Veev, who was the stand-in president for President Putin, uh, who, who talked about not using, he's talked about using nukes before, many times may, maybe after his, his late night vodka sessions, but he certainly talked about it. And then this week after the international, uh, criminal court in the Hague in indicted president, uh, Putin and, and want, wanna put him on trial for war crimes. Uh, here you have me admit of saying, let's strike the Hague with a missile. Um, do you, do you take some of these threats, uh, to use nuclear weapons as a, a psychological attempt to put the west off, not to go deeper into Ukraine and get further involved, or do you take them seriously?
Speaker 1:I I, I don't take them seriously. What I do think, though, that they are very serious in that I believe the White House and a number of Western governments actually have bought into this Russian narrative that going into Ukraine, going into Crimey is a red line, and it's a red line that'll lead to nuclear escalation. So I think Putin has been extremely successful along with his sidekicks like Medvedev and Yuko and the like to threaten this, because there are a number of countries who, uh, believe that this will happen, and therefore they'll have to respond. Now, um, I, I don't take it as seriously because I, I do believe that countries like China, Iran, India, Pakistan de pay very heavily on them being nuclear powers to threaten their neighbors to th uh, you know, it's this uneasy piece over cashmere for Indian Pakistan and the like. And for China, uh, you know, for China being able to be this sort of bulldozer in the Indo-Pacific, it's, it's backing that up with its strong nuclear power status. But we're Russia to use a tactical nuclear weapon, and Armageddon did not ensue, and the war went on anyway. It would undercut seriously this concept of deterrent strategy that those other countries and this global south has been counting on for a really long time. And it would be showing the emperor has no closed. Um, and I'll take it a step further. Um, there have been tactical nuclear weapons sitting in coal grad for decades. They were the SS 20 ones, then the SS 20 threes, and now the scandals, um, and Poland and Lithuania have had to live in that neighborhood for a very long time. And so this isn't new. I mean, people are looking at this as if this tactical nuclear weapons threat is new. If you talk to the polls and the Lithuanians, they'll raise their hands and go, uh, no, this is something we deal with every day. And and I'll be honest, I don't think western intelligence on whether those, uh, scanners have a nuclear warhead on top of them is very good, because most Russian tactical weapons are triple capable. They can carry conventional, uh, chemical kamaya or nuclear warheads. And I, and I think other than seeing their certain sheds, they carry this kind of sensitive stuff. Um, we don't know on any given day whether there's a scandal sitting in kina gra have a, a nuclear warhead on their top. Now, having said all that, um, if you are a commander in the battlefield and, uh, and Putin says, I want you to use an aand, I want you to use a tactical nuclear weapon here, I'm thinking that if I'm that military and I'm already, um, I'm very skeptical of what Putin's ordering me to do, and I'm going, really, you want me to go use this and then march into a dirty battle space so I can drop dead in 3.5 seconds? Um, so it's not Putin who's gonna be pushing that button like on a strategic strike. It is a military commander on the ground who's gonna have to deploy that and then have to deal with the fallout of that weapon and what I like to call a dirty battle space. And it's gonna be worse than zeria, you know, making your guys march in there. And, and that's what you're talking about. And I think that commander's gonna blow back and say, um, I have a conventional weapon that'll give me the same outcome here. Why am I using a, a tactical nuclear weapon that's just gonna kill my guys and not have that much of an effect on the Ukrainian military? So I I, I'm looking at this perhaps a little too logically, but that's how I see this playing out.
Speaker 3:No, I, I appreciate your sensibilities and let's, and I completely pray that you're right on this. So tell me your read on, you know, Putin standing next to, to Shei, who has said that part of the, you know, the Chinese are, are neutral, that they want to have dialogue to end the war. And part of that is this peace proposal, uh, that they laid out some time ago, which talks about n protecting nuclear power plants, not, uh, new using nuclear weapons. And p President Putin says, today, by the way, we have understood, just while we were meeting, while I was meeting with President Xi, that Britain has declared the delivery of tanks, uh, but also with shells, uh, which have enriched uranium quote. If this happens, Russia will be forced to react accordingly. The west is now using a weapon with a nuclear component, unquote. Now, I understand that these shells are armored piercing shells. They're not nuclear shells, they're not nuclear weapons. But even still, the Russians are suggesting this would be the use of a dirty nuclear bomb or a dirty bomb, not nuclear, um, and that they would react. Is that not a threat, another threat from President Putin today?
Speaker 1:Yeah, I, I think Putin's, uh, is doing what he always does, which is creating a false flag narrative. So the, the challengers, the British tanks that they're supplying to Ukraine, um, like many tanks in many conflicts use, um, depleted uranium rounds. This is not the same as 19.9%, uh, enriched uranium, which is what the threshold is from low enriched to highly enriched uranium. Uh, so it's a ridiculous argument, but probably has enough people who don't know what kind of rounds the British are talking about and don't know enough of this. And, and in the United States as well as elsewhere in the West and in the global south, you have people who will listen to Putin and go, oh my God, oh my God, oh my God, this is terrible. When in effect the, the rounds that they're talking about are depleted uranium rounds. We have used these, uh, in the west in conflicts for a very long time, as have Russia. They have nothing to do with enriched uranium, by the way, the, the standard for enriched uranium for, um, a commercial nuclear reactor is 4.4%. And, um, and depleted uranium rounds aren't there. So I'm just pointing this out. So you're not talking about anything that delivers, um, any sort of, uh, highly rich uranium or even low enriched uranium at a level that, uh, you know, that is even remotely, uh, with yellow cake, for example. So this is Putin conflating a story and a narrative in order to try to justify if, if, if I use nuclear weapons, it's because the west has forced me to, because they're now introducing this stuff into the battlefield and it's their fault. And I think anyone
Speaker 3:Buys. So he is, so, he is not sorry to jump in. He's not threatening, but he's saying that in front of President Xi to say, what, what, you know, we're not the bad guys. It's the west that is bringing this stuff to the battle. It's
Speaker 1:Not just to President Xi, it's, it's being broadcast globally. It's to say, look, if I'm forced to do this, it's because the west forced me to do this, because they use nukes first. And that is not what these rounds are at all. And I'm sorry to be too, uh, too specific on this, but I think knowing enrichment levels is, uh, is a good thing cuz it allows you to be a little smarter than listening to his stuff on this.
Speaker 3:Well, I know in, in, in being in many a battlefield, uh, we, we were told if if there's an exploded tank there with a possible round that, um, with one of these rounds, then you know, you better not to go and play on the tank. Yeah. Uh, but you know, it's, it's not, you don't have to dawn your gas mask. Uh, you said something just before the war started and I I I looked at it. Um, Ukraine doesn't have to win against the Russians. You just gotta make it hurt. The reality is that an invasion by Russia will result in a long, drawn out conflict. That's the credible deterrent. Now here we are more than a year later, it didn't deter, uh, maybe because they, they just didn't buy that it would be a long drawn out conflict. They didn't understand that. Um, but, but if that didn't deter them, I mean, what does, what would,
Speaker 1:You know, there's an old saying that many of my military colleagues like to say that, that military officers learn in their first year in any war college, which is that, um, in order to actually, um, deter an enemy from doing something, you actually have to have, uh, those weapons that offense on the ground, uh, in order to deter them. And you know, when I said that I foolishly thought we would move much more quickly to arm Ukraine, uh, to make it be that porcupine that no one wants to attack. And that did not happen. Instead we got incrementalism. So I think, um, and, and we still have incrementalism in many ways, um, you know, um, a week before the war we were not gonna give them javelin. Um, you know, and then we gave them javelin. And this has been this water torture approach to arming Ukraine. So I think what happened here is as long as we did not go all out in giving Ukraine what needed to have an effective deterrent, you know, your enemy's not gonna stop if they don't think you have the stuff to stop them. Um, so, uh, because we've used incrementalism, the Russians still think they have a chance. So in other words, even today we're denying Ukraine long-range fires like, um, like attacks and we're denying them UASs like reaper and um, which is now all the sudden and very famous like reaper and it's army equivalent, the gray eagle.
Speaker 3:Um, this was the drone that was shot that was forced down by the Russians in the black side,
Speaker 1:Correct? Correct. And we are denying them, um, multi-domain aircraft as well. You know, and the way to take back places like Crimea, the way to assume Ukraine's sovereignty over all of Ukraine is to actually give them the equipment to attack the Russians where they're living and they're living in occupied Crimea. They've taken over Sevastopol and many of their fires that they are shooting at Ukrainian civilians, at hospitals, at critical civilian infrastructure are being done from that port are being done from ships. Um, initially the two control centers for the Iranian drones were being launched from Crimea. And so, and every time the west gave Ukraine something that could reach a little deeper, the Russians just moved it, you know, 25 kilometers out of the range. You know, they, they read the newspapers, they know what's going on, they listen to you and that's what they've done. And so the incrementalism is what keeps the Russian going because the Russians now believe that the red lines that they have established, meaning that, you know, if Ukraine comes into Crimea, that's a red line. Unfortunately, a number of, uh, of western governments, including my own, um, seem to be buying into those Russian red lines about Crimea. And if you're not gonna give you Ukraine the weapons that it needs to actually, um, deter Russia, it it's not gonna happen. So my view is this war could be won this year, um, but it's not gonna be won if you don't give them the equipment they need to stop Russia from using Crimea as a safe haven and which to launch on the rest of Ukraine.
Speaker 3:So do you think that the Biden administration is suddenly gonna give him attacks and let'em go for Crimea? I mean, or do you think that it's gonna be, continue to be this slow drip? Um, and that leads us where,
Speaker 1:So I think two things. Um, there's always been, there's always been a host of reasons given, um, on this. And so I'm gonna go back to the technical ones first. Initially it was they'll never be able to use the high Mars and Atacs. Well, their success rate with high Mars using the Gimler and the small diameter bombs was, you know, over 80%. Um, which is certainly higher than most of our troops were able to accomplish in, in, you know, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, et cetera. Um, then there was the excuse that, um, we don't want them targeting Russia with these excessive ranges. And then that excuse morphed into a couple weeks ago, if we don't have enough to give you cuz we're not making enough of'em, we don't have enough without, um, deterring the readiness of our own active duty units. Um, and then it came back to a political decision, um, because for a really long time the reluctance to give them the reaper and the Gray Eagle was tied to, um, an operational security decision. So as we know, both the Pentagon and the White House came out and said the reaper that Russia took down was wiped clean of all serious sensitive information. My question then was, okay, if that's the case that there goes your operational security reason for not giving Ukraine the Reaper, because if you can wipe it clean now, you can wipe it clean if it was shot down by Russia in Crimea, for example.
Speaker 3:Okay, so are these excuses?
Speaker 1:I think they are excuses. I think the bottom line is the political one. I think the Biden administration is afraid not just of escalation, but I, my personal view is they're afraid of what happens when Russia loses and Ukraine wins. They instead of seizing this initiative of understanding Russia can lose and seeing what that future might hold and something we went through in the nineties and there were smart people who learned to seize that initiative, we're now sitting here with a, a great deal of angst over what happens when Russia loses. And I think that to me is more of the reason than just plain escalation. I think that there's not a lot of good strategic thinking going on, on, okay, Russia can lose and is let, let's let Russia have that problem to deal with and instead there's a real fear there. That's just my
Speaker 3:Deborah Kagan so interesting to talk to you. Thank you so much for your time. I hope we can do this again.
Speaker 1:Right. Thank you.
Speaker 3:And that's our backstory on the Russia China meeting. Have no doubt that China and Russia are teaming up as a counterweight to American influence, dam, human rights and rule of law everywhere. What appears to be preposterous is that both she and Putin touted the UN charter at the end of their meetings. The charter, by the way, was signed in June of 1945. The principles laid out in chapter one include the equality in self-determination of nations, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the obligation of member countries to obey the charter. Russia's Putin has in effect wiped his feet on the UN charter with his invasion of Ukraine and China pretending to be pursuing a peace plan that's failed to condemn Russia's invasion and acted as Putin's lifeline against international sanctions. And no one with their head screwed on straight can see anything but two nations trying to take us all back in time when only might was right. I'm Dana Lewis. Thanks for listening to backstory. Please share the podcast and I'll talk to you again soon.