BACK STORY With DANA LEWIS

WAGNER MERCENARIES AND RUSSIA IN UKRAINE

February 09, 2023 Dana Lewis Season 5 Episode 16
BACK STORY With DANA LEWIS
WAGNER MERCENARIES AND RUSSIA IN UKRAINE
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Show Notes Transcript

On this Back Story the Wagner Group, meddling in Africa, fighting in Ukraine, who are they? Guns for hire, unleashed by the Kremlin.   We talk to Soufan Center expert Colin Clarke. 

And from Kyiv, Life Line Charity's Paul Niland on the war in Ukraine.

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Speaker 1:

We will always come out on top of evil. This lies at the core of, of our, but also your traditions. However, the horizon never stays clear for a while. Once the old evil is defeated, the new one is attempting to rise its head. Do you have a feeling that evil will crumble Once again? I can see in your eyes now, we think the same way as you do. We know freedom will win.

Speaker 2:

Hi everyone, and welcome to another edition of backstory. I'm Dana Lewis. That was Ukrainian President Zelensky in London speaking to British lawmakers, thanking them for arms to fight off Russia, lobbying for more weapons, including fighter aircraft. Russia is launching a new offensive as the one year anniversary of the war approaches February 24th, Russian President Putin's attempt of fight off a piece of Ukraine has so far largely failed, but not altogether. On this backstory, one of Putin's attack dogs has been the Shadowy Wagner Group. We speak to the Suan Center about what is Wagner and why is there a private army operating out of Russia. And we talk to podcast regular Paul Nyland in Kiev about the war in his sense of how it's advancing or retreating as the case may be. Colin Clark is a senior research fellow with the Suan Center think tank and writes about international conflict and terrorism. Hi Colin. Welcome back.

Speaker 3:

Thanks for having me. Dana.

Speaker 2:

11 months into the war in Ukraine's, significant Russian military casualties, you've ridden have forced Moscow to rely more heavily on the Wagner Group, a criminal linked private military company. Is that true?

Speaker 3:

Yeah, it's true. That's why I wrote it. Uh, they've been forced to, uh, you know, scour prisons and jails for manpower. Uh, they've significantly lowered the barrier to entry to, to be part of this, uh, armed force. And they're using these individuals as cannon fodder. Uh, there's been reports of vogner, uh, mercenaries fighting like zombies just trudging ahead. Um, and again, these are people that are poorly trained, uh, and not really motivated by anything other than being out of jail. So it's not a surprise, although there's

Speaker 2:

Been, I should have asked, is it true now? Because it would seem that a lot of the Wagner group, um, ha, has been chewed up in the fighting. Um, and a lot of people would question how effective they've been on the battlefield. And then in fact, some of the military, and there's probably three questions in this, but some of the military, um, shuffling by the Kremlin of who's leading the military, would, would indicate that the the army commanders are more in charge than anybody from Wagner would be.

Speaker 3:

Well, I think that's true. I think, you know, the, uh, general grass mobs of the world are still, you know, looked upon as the, um, the cream of the crop in terms of the Russian military. If Guinea Pergo in the leader of the Vogner group has really only emerged since this conflict has started as someone with a more prominent position that's in and of itself led to infighting, uh, between the group because he's looking to claim credit. Interestingly, uh, there was an announcement, I think just this week that, uh, Vogner would no longer be recruiting from prisons and jails, uh, which means that, and, and you described it correctly, it's been a meat grinder. They're running out of people. I think, you know, even for individuals that are felons and convicts that are looking at, you know, really long jail sentences, it's still preferable to stay in jail, then to go out and be slaughtered on the battlefield, uh, fighting for a country that really doesn't care for you in the first place.

Speaker 2:

I should have started off with what is Wagner, because it's a, it's a, a gun for hire. Yeah. Private military company that is supported by the Kremlin. I mean, what does that mean?

Speaker 3:

Yeah, so it's a, it's, in my opinion, it's an extension of Russian foreign policy. Uh, if you think about, um, uh, a private military company like Blackwater used to be, uh, for example, that's not the same as the Vogner group, right? Because Blackwater wasn't an extension of US foreign policy per se. Uh, there wasn't the same links of command and control. In fact, Blackwater could be fairly autonomous. Uh, they were looked at as a force multiplier and a particularly acute time of acute manpower shortage. And a lot of these guys were, were former military themselves. Vogner is a different animal. Um, there's a layer of strategic ambiguity that very few people buy into, including myself. Um, I think, you know, these guys are used, uh, because it's convenient and, and because of Russia is suffering, uh, you know, significant losses on the battlefield. So they've brought them in, um, as a, as a matter of desperation. And it's a whole other question about whether they've been effective or not. That's a big debate right now. I, I would say now,

Speaker 2:

How, how does it, just before you go on the, how does it serve Russian interests to have them operating alongside or in front of the Russian Army? Like what, where, where is the division there of what one does and what the other does?

Speaker 3:

Yeah, so I think it, it suits it, it behooves the Russians to have, uh, mercenaries on the battlefield because, uh, if they, if they weren't there there, the Russians would have to potentially conscript individuals, uh, closer to home and, and potentially with people that have, uh, links to, you know, higher office. When you start recruiting from elite families in St. Petersburg and Moscow, well, now all of a sudden the war comes a lot closer to home. If you're just taking, you know, scraping the bottom of the barrel and throwing, you know, criminals out there, no one really cares, sadly, uh, that these individuals are, uh, are, are being killed. So it buys, it buys the Kremlin time, um, and it, you know, and, and the process, it occupies the Ukrainians, right, who have to fight these guys, even though they're not considered, uh, elite by any stretch. It also saves, uh, conventional Russian military forces, uh, and saves them to, to fight another day.

Speaker 2:

So they had been operating before the Ukraine War, though they were in Syria. In fact, they came into conflict with, uh, American forces that were operating on the ground. And then you've written extensively about them operating in Africa, kind of in a transactional manner to, to quote you, which is that they, they don't necessarily come in and set up a diplomatic, there's no diplomatic mission attached to Wagner, or they don't come in and try to s you know, set up a government that might be friendly to the Kremlin. They seem to be there for the loop.

Speaker 3:

There's nothing diplomatic about Wagner. Uh, they are essentially security for, uh, mining concessions, quid pro quo. So they go in, they provide quote unquote security, which is really just, you know, kinetic force to a lot of dictators and post coup leaders in African states. And in exchange, they're given, uh, access to gold mines, uranium mines, uh, and other ways that Moscow is able to evade sanctions. Uh, and that's where if we wanna talk about are they effective, are they not effective, uh, I would say that's probably their most effective role is in playing that kind of security for concessions, um, role where they're, they're helping Moscow, uh, gain revenue on the battlefield. You know, there, there's, it's really quantity over quality. And, and so I'm a bit more skeptical about how effective they are fighting in places like Bach moot Sodar and elsewhere.

Speaker 2:

What do you think is the danger in Africa, for instance, when they leave those areas, what kind of vacuum do they leave behind and who fills it?

Speaker 3:

That's a great question. I wrote about this for foreign policy, um, and I read it, and this is something where the United States really needs to be careful, and I would say US allies too, because as the US withdraws, and if you listen, I've been critical of President Biden in this regard. He said, the US is withdrawing forces from places like Sub-Saharan Africa, so we can focus on great power competition. Uh, Moscow correctly sees Africa as part and parcel of great power competition. Uh, so when the resources run dry, the, the Russians are gonna leave. In fact, they have no long-term strategic interest there. And in the process, they've destabilized regions like the Sahel, where they've committed grievous human rights abuses, which in turn has helped these jihadi groups, Al-Qaeda and isis, uh, linked to affiliates recruit new members. So you now have an ungoverned space where jihadi groups have gained power and who's left holding the bag? There's gonna be pressure on the United States and France to go back in and do something into this region, which has been devastated and destabilized. And there's concern that this could turn into another Afghanistan,

Speaker 2:

Right? I think General Petras said a long time ago, wherever you leave a vacuum, uh, it will be filled by extremists like Isis.

Speaker 3:

Without question. I think he's absolutely right about that.

Speaker 2:

Tell me, do you think that there's a danger, I mean, what is, if, if you, probably, when you're, when you're analyzing Wagner, you must think of what is in Putin's head. Is there not a danger of allowing somebody like Pergo Zen, uh, even if he's so-called, you know, a friend to Putin, uh, of running, I don't wanna call it a state within a state, but it's certainly an armed force within a, within a, a country that is independent and has even clashed with the Russian military. Um, is there some danger there in allowing Proco to become too powerful?

Speaker 3:

Yeah, I think that's what we're seeing right now, actually. Uh, you know, Pergo himself is a former criminal, uh, and he went from criminal to hotdog vendor to caterer, right? Putin chef, to now essentially a warlord. And I think, um, if you've seen some of the videos on Telegram, where ProGo in and, and Vogner troops are, you know, criticizing the Russian military in some fairly colorful and pointed language, there does seem to be a rift emerging, uh, within the Russian side. That's not surprising to me. Um, you know, that command and control is beginning to fray, uh, because the Russians have been underperforming, uh, and, and, you know, with their lack of focus on logistics, um, they've really been struggling and, and it's laid bare for everyone to see. So the fact that there's infighting doesn't surprise me. I do think for, for Putin, someone that's a megalomaniac, anyone that's becoming popular, he deems as a threat. Uh, and so we'll see, you know, how long Pergo zen's able to kind of keep his star rising before he gets, uh, shoved aside and marginalized in favor of someone else.

Speaker 2:

I mean, there are a few competing groups, right? I mean, Kadi, the, the Chechen leader, uh, has taken a prominent role in the fighting in Ukraine and, and is often led Chechen forces forward ahead of the Russian military, sometimes supported by the Russian military, sometimes he's been extremely critical of, of the Russian Army, and even the command in Moscow. Uh, and then you have Pergo. And now this week there have been reports that gas prom, I mean, this is the, the, the state, um, you know, gas and energy provider talking about putting together some kind of mercenary force. I mean, how do you read that?

Speaker 3:

Yeah, it's funny that the timing's interesting. Cause I'm actually reading Steve Cole's book right now. Uh, ExxonMobil and American Power. And so there's long been links between energy companies and the need to have some kind of a security force, because these, these companies typically operate in fairly unstable regions. And so, uh, the fact that there is an armed force connected to an energy firm, not necessarily novel, uh, by any stretch, but it, you know, there's been a lot of twists and turns in, in the last 11 months. So I, you know, very few things surprise me at this point. Um, gas prom developing its own armed force. Sure, why not? The, the question becomes, where are those people called from? Right? I mean, it's likely the same pool of individuals, uh, that Vogner is attempting to recruit from, or that the Kremlin is, is attempting to conscript, right? It's not like they're going outside of Russia. So, you know, I'm a bit skeptical as to how effective that force might be.

Speaker 2:

Some people would say that this is very much in line with how Putin operates, that he likes to, he likes to divide and have everybody worried and looking over their shoulder at, at, at the shadows, um, a around them. And that, you know, by having different arm groups, uh, he always has that security that nobody has too much power.

Speaker 3:

Yeah. That's been his strategy. Although I'd say he's a poor strategist. I mean, in the West, we've built him up to be 10 feet tall, um, and reality's probably about five foot six. Uh, and, and that's, I, I'm joking, but it, it shows because, uh, you know, he,

Speaker 2:

Sorry, that, that's what these elevator shoes on or off

Speaker 3:

<laugh>. Yeah. I mean, he, he was really overconfident going into this conflict, thought it was gonna be, uh, a cakewalk. And it's proven to be anything. But, and I haven't seen really major adjustments coming from Putin himself. Uh, there's been a lot of finger pointing and hand ringing. Uh, but in terms of, you know, the direction, and again, he's not a military man. He's an Intel guy, right? He's former kgb. He's not former Russian military. Uh, so it doesn't surprise me that he's not the strategist that many have made him out to be.

Speaker 2:

La Last question to you, Colin, and that would be, do you, is there a risk, um, maybe it's not so clever having too many different addresses for power in Russia that in fact, there could be a risk to Putin himself from Pergo Zen or Pergo Zen could, uh, be a successor to Putin if he becomes that powerful?

Speaker 3:

It could be. And, and I think you're right. When you decentralize power to the extent that we're seeing now, it becomes harder to kind of marshal and master forces, right? So when you see these divisions within the kind of Russian side, uh, which are probably being exacerbated on a daily basis, uh, that pales in comparison to, uh, the cohesion, the surprising cohesion, in my opinion, that we've seen on the NATO side, uh, where NATO countries have largely, uh, been in agreement about supplying Ukraine with troops, equipment, and trading for the most part. I mean, you had the whole leopard debate. There's a lot of kind of, you know, I'll show you mine if you show me yours, uh, gamesmanship that that's going on. But, but compared to the Russians, I'd say NATO is far more unified, uh, going, you know, on a year into this

Speaker 2:

Conflict. Colin Clark with the Suan Center, always a pleasure, Colin, thank you so much.

Speaker 3:

Thank you.

Speaker 2:

Paul Nyland, uh, a regular on this podcast is in Kiev. He runs Lifeline Ukraine, which is a suicide prevention charity helping among others, Ukrainian war vets. Hi, Paul.

Speaker 4:

Hi Diner. It's always good to join you.

Speaker 2:

Good. Always great to hear from you. And Kivan, can you give me some idea what life is, is like in Kyiv? I mean, we were just talking before I pressed record, and you were saying a lot of people don't even answer these, uh, incoming missile alerts and go down into bomb shelters, which surprises me.

Speaker 4:

Well, you know, I, I mean, one of the best responses to Putin is to, is to continue living as normal a life as possible. Um, you know, I mean, the, there are inconveniences to life in Kiev. We're, we're dealing, again, we're, we're still dealing with this schedule of, of rolling power outages. And so, you know, I I, I begin my day by looking at where I'm gonna have power, where I'm gonna work from. I'm, I'm gonna be at home for a few hours in the office for a few hours. But it's an inconvenience. It's, it's, it's, it's no more than that. Uh, I mean, of course a risk does exist because we, you know, they have targeted Kiev as well as many other cities across the country. The risk exists. Absolutely. Risk drone. Yeah. The, the, of course there's a risk, but, but you know, by the same token, I've got things to do, you know, as you just said, I, I, I run a charity here and, and, you know, I've, I've things that I have to get done as I go about my daily business. Right.

Speaker 2:

Let me ask you this then. Is there a feeling of a storm coming from Russia? Because I mean, so much is being, is talked about in this new planned defensive by Russia, especially around, um, February the 24th, the anniversary date of the r original Russian invasion. I mean, I know you're in touch with a lot of people there. What is your feeling that, that Russia has got in terms of the, the, the next attempt to throw a hard ride at Ukraine?

Speaker 4:

Look, Putin loves anniversaries, and he loves significant dates. And I mean, we, we've seen attacks on Ukraine that fell on Independence Day. We, we, we, we saw the murder of Anna Poll Kaska in Moscow in her apartment building on Putin's birthday. You know, he, it's symbolic dates are a, are a big deal for him. So yes, I think we can expect something. Um, I mean, he's also talked about capturing the entirety of Danette Lugansk by the end of March, but he's, he's, he's issuing orders to his military that they're simply not capable of fulfilling. Will, will there be more and more of their, uh, poorly trained conscripts thrown against the Ukrainian armed forces to try to a trip them and to, to, you know, kill and wound as many Ukrainians as possible military and civilians? Yes, absolutely. We, we anticipate that that is gonna continue, and that is why Ukraine has to have the capacity to be able to, uh, respond to Putin's constant escalation, you know, and there, there's, there's a view in the West about what, what Russia might consider to be an escalation, but what was the, the essence of your question? Is there another escalation coming from Putin? Yes, there is.

Speaker 2:

So how do you, I mean, as a journalist, I don't like to, you know, I think war's a a horrible thing as a human being. I think war's a horrible thing. Um, and, and talk of more weapons, more weapons, more weapons, is the answer to the conflict. Leave me somewhat uncomfortable. But the realities are, are the realities in terms of h how do you stop this conflict? And a lot of people think the only way to stop it is for Russia to withdraw, and they have to be beaten back. Were you watching President Zelensky deliver these messages the last few days in London, today in the European Union? Um, you know, gimme, gimme bigger guns, give, give me war planes. And and are you comfortable with that?

Speaker 4:

I, I, I watched the speech from, uh, from Parliament yesterday, um, which I thought was excellent. Um, I, I mean, we, we, we have to look at what the, the war aims are. And the best way to do that is to sadly, um, look at what the Russian propagandists are saying, and the, the odious, uh, margarita Simian that yesterday or the day before, she w she was saying, um, you, you have to, uh, change your, uh, uh, intentions according to your capabilities. So she says, we want to liberate, liberate, I mean, destroy and, and, and capture land that they're not entitled to, but they're, they're talking about all of dank, all of Lugansk, all of Zeria and all of Heron. They will not be welcomed back into Heron City. That's an absolute fact. Right? But, but they're still talking about that. And, and then she went on to say, do we want Odessa and Nikolai as well? Yes. But maybe at this time we can't take it. Maybe we'll have to come back for more. Right? So when they're talking in terms like that about, you know, turning Ukraine into a rump state with absolutely zero access to export either agriculture or steel, or whatever it is that we've been exporting over the years. I mean, they already have done that on the sea. Jank was an important, port Marik was a, an important port. And that's,

Speaker 2:

I mean, it certainly reinforces this point that if you don't stop them now, they will continue, uh, and try and take more and try, try and take more later. And if they can't get it now, they'll take it next month or next year. Um, and that, that that's the only solution of conflicts to push them back. The

Speaker 4:

Only solution just coming, the, the only solution is to completely defeat them. Because if you, if you were to look at what would be the goals of taking Odessa and Nikola, it's to then link, not just have the landbridge from mainland, well, from Russia proper to occupied Crimea, but it also then links up trans inria, and it opens Moldova up to attack as well. And we've, we've seen Sergei Labov four days ago saying that mold over is the next project that the West is trying to turn into an anti-Russian country, et cetera, et cetera. You know, and, and they still keep talking

Speaker 2:

About translation. Yeah. Cause I've, I've had to cover Lav Roth for 20 some odd years mm-hmm.<affirmative>, whenever he says that the West is trying to do something, it means Russia's trying to do something. And he's laying the tile work for stepping into Moldova further into Moldova, because they're already occupying part of it. Right. But exactly. The, the, they're stepping further into Moldova. So you, it's, it's though, it's always the upside down with labral.

Speaker 4:

Yeah. Yes. I mean, the, the, the one skill that he has is, is to be a, a, a bare face liar. You see no flicker of emotion or, I mean, his eyes don't, don't betray him when he is telling lies. He's so good at it. He's been doing it for years. But, but no, you're, you're exactly right. You know, I mean, they, they already occupy a part of, of Moldova, interestingly, actually, one of the people who showed up in, uh, in Danette in 2014, actually was transplanted from Trans Israel. He, he'd been, I think he was the deputy Minister, minister of Defense or something like that in this Russian created and Russian controlled enclave there on the borders of Moldova and, and Ukraine. And, and when they created, when the Russians created the, the Danette People's Republic, they shipped this guy in, his name was Vladimir Ahan Tuev or something like that. I wrote about him in one of my articles that I wrote like six, seven years ago. Like, it, it was called Creating the Fake Republics. And it was an analysis of, of the Russian characters that had been inserted there that were simply not locals, and so therefore can never be called.

Speaker 2:

And some of them documented to be for former K G B, uh, F s B. I mean, this was not a grassroots uprising by any estimation.

Speaker 4:

So in fact, TUEV, his background was, he was one of the ahman officers in the Baltic states. And when they were reasserting their independence, he was involved in, uh, uh, one of the deadly incidents that left multiple fatalities amongst the locals there. And, and, uh, just before he was about to be arrested by the legitimate authorities, I forget whether it was Latvia or Lithuania, but just before he was about to be arrested, um, somebody, uh, gave him a tip off and he bugged out and went to Transista, which had already been created by that time.

Speaker 2:

President Zelensky, you know, is delivering this message to Europe now that this is Europe's future. Yep. But if you don't support Ukraine, uh, there, there goes the rest of Europe as well. Is that true too dramatic, uh, a message to high stakes, uh, uh, you know, uh, a calculation that the West has to make do, is it, is it an over dramatization, um, of what's happening? Does it, let, let me spin my question one more time. Does it create this impossible, uh, blockage of any future ceasefire or, or peace talks that might involve some kind of temporary or otherwise territorial compromise in Ukraine?

Speaker 4:

<laugh>? Um, okay. So first of all, I don't think Vladimir Zelensky is over egging or over exaggerating anything at all. Um, we, we, Russia is a rogue state that interferes in the internal affairs of countries throughout Europe. We know that they support both the far left and the far right in many countries. We, we, I mean, you and I have discussed it in, in, in the past, in actual fact, I think we talked about the example of Marine Le Pen's bank loan that she got from a, a, a Russian bank that ended up, according to an ft investigation being, uh, you know, an a a a, an apartment, you know, in a, a residential area on the outskirts of Moscow, right? Um, Putin, Putin destabilizes everywhere. And the, the fact of the matter is, is that his regime will not survive beyond the defeat of Russia militarily in Ukraine. And so by defeating Russia in Ukraine, we will bring an end to that rogue regime that interferes everywhere. It interferes in Austrian politics, in German politics in the uk. They obviously had a hand in Brexit. We know about the, um, series of meetings between, uh, Aaron Banks and, uh, and, and, and Russian figures, particularly figures from the Russian embassy. We know about the, the, the conservative friends of Russia. And you know, how, how they have, um, bought influence within one of the major political parties, um, in the United Kingdom. They, they, they sewed influence in the other one when Jeremy Corbin was the Libra leader of the Labor Party as well. And he had Shamus mil and, and Andrew Murray as, as two of his key advisors, both of whom are known Putin regimes or suck up. Right. Um, yeah. Put Putin, Putin is a bad player everywhere. Everywhere. And so Zelensky is exactly right. I haven't seen actually what he said in Europe today. I've been, I've been busy, and I, I had an appointment that I've just come back from right now, but, but I'll be catching up on that. And I, I'm, I'm certain that his message is right and, and the other, but the other thing,

Speaker 2:

Well, he, he said, he said, let me, let me be your news source today. However, however wobbly that may be, Zelensky was asked by, by a reporter about the UK's announcements that it started to provide training to Ukrainian pilots. Mm-hmm.<affirmative>. Um, and he said, interestingly, and he kind of flirted with it yesterday, anyway, he said, our visit to London achieved results. And we have moved towards decisions concerning long-range missiles in the training of our pilots. That is an important road to getting fighter fighter jets that we need. And he adds that there are certain agreements which are not public, but are positive. Do you wanna take a guess at what they might be?

Speaker 4:

I mean, you can, you can look back at what has already been provided to Ukraine and see how that was paving the way for the provision of aircraft down the line. So a lot of these radar systems that, that have, have been sent into the country, they're designed to interact with modern Western fighter jets that, that, I mean, as a standalone piece of kit, they're very, very useful to us for detecting incoming missiles and drones and whatnot. But, but in terms of targeting the enemy from the air, that's what those radar units are built for. And obviously, there's no point in training pilots if the planes are not gonna come afterwards. It, it, it must happen. And, and when we look towards Ukraine's counter Offensives that we will see, um, breaking the, the land bridge to Crimea that has been created in the, the immediate Blitzkrieg in, in, in late February and early March of last year, um, you know, the, the, the main battle tanks flanked by infantry fighting vehicles, the Bradleys and so on that are coming in from the United States mm-hmm.<affirmative>, um, uh, supported by superior, by, by air dominance. You know, that's how we knock a hole in that landbridge. That's how we liberate me topol. That's how we liberate Burk. I mean, it's, that's why's

Speaker 2:

How, you know, it's full of, it's full of escalatory what ifs, right? Because if you have an aircraft firing on a Ukrainian aircraft from Russia, you know, when the Ukrainian aircraft fires back at that target or takes out a missile launcher on the other side of the border, I, I mean, you, you, you know, where it all, I don't know where it leads, but it, it paves the road towards, you know, just more and more escalation involving direct attack on, on Russia. That's the, that's the fear, right?

Speaker 4:

No, but I mean, you, I, I understand that that's the fear. And in fact, the last article that I wrote, my, my most recent article is always my, my pin tweet. It, it's about not taking seriously any of these utterances that come out of Russia that are, you know, this next step is escalatory. The, the high Mars was escalatory, the, the provision of

Speaker 2:

You wouldn't consider, you wouldn't consider firing an aircraft over Russian airspace escalatory.

Speaker 4:

So Daniel, the, the head of the National Security and Defense Council, uh, two days ago, was very explicit about this. And, and he said, we have given assurances guarantees to our Western partners that we will not use their weapons to attack, uh, assets, military assets inside of Russia, but we have our own weapons that can certainly hit them, and we will. And, and Ukraine has already been doing this. And the other way that you have to look at this as well is, is in what Russia perceives Russia to be, which is, which is one of the things that I wrote about right in, in my most recent article, that's they perceive

Speaker 2:

Crime that apparently is a borderless state that, uh, wants to expand<laugh> under po endlessly.

Speaker 4:

Yeah, exactly. Exactly. And, and the recent maps of Russia, the, uh, Russia that have been, uh, uh, put out include all of Heon, all of Zara, et cetera, et cetera, when they have no hope of gaining all of those oblasts anyway, but, but going back to the question of what does Russia consider to be Russia, they absolutely consider that Crimea wrongly is a part of Russia. We are hitting Crimea already. We are hitting air bases in Crimea. We are hitting refineries in Crimea. We hit the Crimea bridge, the, the, the Strait Bridge. Right. And at the end of the day, What did Russia do? Did they, did they come through on their threats or their, their, you know, Russian military doctrine says that they can use a nuclear weapon if there is a threat to the territorial integrity of Russia. Well, they have them, and they declared Headon to be Russia as well. And they, when we liberated it, they went back across the other side of the DRA River and, and set up new lines of, of defense over there. Right. Well, lines of defense and attack, because they continually, since Leb, the liberation of the city of, of, of, they continue bombarding it on a daily basis to make the lives of civilians there miserable.

Speaker 2:

Te Tell me, just to conclude and, and, and try to wrap this up because there's so many things I wanna talk to you about, but, um, do you think as we look forward that the war in Ukraine is going to be decided in the next few months in terms of the, these are critical battles that, that will probably take place, um, depending on who wins territory, who loses territory that will shape not only the ground, but it will shape the atmosphere for discussions going forward?

Speaker 4:

I, I do believe that there's going to be decisive events in the coming months, um, that, that do change the course of the war. Right. Uh, and, and they will be, as I mentioned earlier on, uh, liberating the cities that are on the, as of Coast Mepo and, and Buran and, and, and breaking that landbridge. And at the point that the Landbridge is broken, Russia has achieved nothing in this war. Right? They, they thought that, you know, they, if they connected Russia proper to Crimea, then they'd sustain their holdover. It breaking the Landbridge says Russia will not sustain their holdover over the peninsula of Crimea on. And the only other way of supplying Crimea other than boats and ferries is, is the, the Kurt Strait Bridge, which we've proven we can hit once, and it can be hit again, and it will be hit again. And at that point, then Crimea and Russia's occupation of it, Crimea becomes isolated. And the occupation I is untenable from, from there on forward. And especially with the longer range weapons that we've been promised now as well, because more and more Russian military assets on the peninsula of Crimea can be targeted and will be targeted as well when, when will be the end of the war. I I know you've spoken with General Ben Hodges on, on several occasions, and, and he is one of the most bull people on this. Um, he's repeatedly said that Crimea can be liberated by August. And I, I, I bow to his greater knowledge.

Speaker 2:

He is a cult following, by the way. And, and because a lot of people feel that he says what the White House won't say or that the Pentagon should say and doesn't say. Yeah, it's interesting, um, the reactions that, that I've had from those interviews, because Hodges is all about, uh, breaking that land bridge and then putting the Ukraine army in the position of bombarding Crimea and making an untenable mm-hmm.<affirmative> or for the Russians. And it's, it's chilling to think that that could be just around the corner in a, in a, in a month or, or three or four. Um, and, and what reaction that will bring from Russia,

Speaker 4:

It, it, well, it's going to be then Russia's internal problem of, of how they work through the chaos. That is going to be the, the, the, the, the power vacuum that will come with the fall of the, the Putin regime. But that's Russia's problem to deal with. And I'm,

Speaker 2:

I mean, it may be then that that's when Russia tries to re really get back to the table with Ukraine and bring about some kind of ceasefire and withdrawal.

Speaker 4:

That's, that's what must happen. Ul ultimately it's, it, it's the full withdrawal of, of all Russian occupying forces from all parts of Ukraine. And whoever Ukraine ends up negotiating that with and whatever international mediation comes with it, there, there're steps that are further down the road, but a as, as we discussed the, the, the breaking of the landbridge and, and the cutting off of the other supply route to Crimea simply makes Russia holding it untenable. And, and the long range missile strikes makes the military occupation or it, it, it ends it. And, and that's, that's always been Ukraine's military goal. And, and not just the military goal, but it's the, it, it, it, it is the united position position of the vast majority, like 97% of the Ukrainian population as well. This is what must happen, this is how it must end. And no Ukrainian citizens, and this is a, a really, really key, important point. No Ukrainian citizens can be left behind occupied or lines of occupation where they're subject to torture and arbitrary execution and, and, and rape and the, the, the, the, the appropriation of their properties and just being treated like, you know, like second class citizens in their own country, it, it, every Ukrainian citizen in every inch of Ukrainian land must be liberated.

Speaker 2:

Paul, just last word to you on Lifeline Ukraine, which probably is now more in demand than it's ever been in terms of, you know, being there to help, uh, you know, su to stop, stop, not stop suicide, but to help people, uh, in that space, how, how do people support you and what would you say about Lifeline UK Ukraine? Just really quickly to wrap it up.

Speaker 4:

So, um, we're, we're currently funded by a grant, uh, from U S I I D, um, through an organization called I Rex. Um, and we had some savings in our last grant, so we just agree to small cost extension with them. Um, I've got other grant applications that are in with various, uh, other parties as well. We take private donations through PayPal and, and, and, uh, and so on. But, um, in, in, in terms of demand af after the Battle of Kiev, when I was looking at the realities that the country faces, what I, what I realized was that Lifeline Ukraine as a, as a national support system for the country, needed to, um, sh we needed to shift how we operate and, and to, to bring in further expertise on the kind of issues facing the Ukraine as a result of occupation, for example. And it's awful, but victims of sexual violence from, you know, previously occupied areas, right? Um, it, that's one of the things that, that, that we've added training to

Speaker 2:

Documented as war crimes right now and, and, and going to the Hague in all likelihood.

Speaker 4:

And, and I mean, it's, it's one of the elements of the war crimes and the, there's a long read on the New Yorker, um, talking about the psychologists who are helping the, the, the victims of such crimes that is absolutely harrowing in, in what it describes. But sorry,

Speaker 2:

But I didn't mean to interrupt you because you said that was an element of the things that Lifeline Ukraine is doing. What else?

Speaker 4:

So, um, the, the, the demand for support from Lifeline Ukraine has, has gone from, uh, around about a thousand calls in chats, um, total interactions per month before February the 24th, up to around 3000 now. And so, you know, it's a, it's a threefold increase in the, the, the, the instances of support that we're providing. I, I, I'm, I'm, I'm immensely proud of the work that my, my colleagues do. And, you know, I'm, I, I look at myself as I, I'm the guy that brought it together. I'm the guy that organized a thing, and I, I manage a thing and I, I'm out there, you know, hunting for grants and applying for funding extensions and that kind of thing. It's, it's my colleagues, Dana, that, that do this like 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and do an interesting thing actually from the early days, like be before we built the, the, the, the national reputation that we have now. Like sometimes we'd be quiet, sometimes I'd have two colleagues, three colleagues in the office, and, and there'd be no calls going on at that moment. And the, the instant the phone rings, they would rush between them to be the one who would answer that call, and they never know what they're going to face. It could be a conversation with, with somebody who is, is lonely. It could be a conversation with somebody who's, uh, struggling with addiction. It, it might be, uh, an emergency situation where there's an imminent threat of somebody taking their own life, uh, whatever the circumstances. They don't know until they answer that phone, but they, they, they rush between them to be the one, to be the next one to answer the next call.

Speaker 2:

I'm sorry, you're one of the few organizations that I wished wasn't successful in terms of that there wasn't any demand for it, you know? But, uh, it's great that you're there and, uh, and people can look up online if they wanna know more about Lifeline Ukraine and Paul Nyland, just put, you know, put it in your browser and there's lots on, you can find the site and you can read in and, and find a way to support as well. So thank you so much, Paul,

Speaker 4:

Uh, a, a pleasure again chatting with you. And, um, you know, it's not just that we are necessary as lifeline Ukraine here in Ukraine. Uh, suicide prevention hotlines are necessary in every single country in the world, and they exist in every single country in the world as well. Ukraine didn't have one until we built ours. So I, I thank you very much for bringing that into the conversation as well, Dana, till next time,

Speaker 2:

Paul Nyland and Kiev, thanks so much, Paul. And that's this week's backstory. Our hearts go out and our prayers too, to the tens of thousands of people affected in Turkey and Syria by this week's horrible earthquake. Time has run out on so many trapped and collapsed buildings. It's truly a humanitarian disaster on a monstrous scale. I'm Dana Lewis. Thanks for listening to Backstory, and I'll talk to you again soon.