On this Back Story, Dana Lewis has two fantastic guests.
(Ret) Major Mike Lyons is a warfare expert and says Ukraine is in trouble without a change of tactics and more military muscle.
And a CIA Station Chief who served the U.S. for more than 3 decades, Douglas London discusses President Putin's and whether his inner circle could turn on him soon? And would Putin use a nuclear weapon, a man without morality says London.
On this Back Story, Dana Lewis has two fantastic guests.
(Ret) Major Mike Lyons is a warfare expert and says Ukraine is in trouble without a change of tactics and more military muscle.
And a CIA Station Chief who served the U.S. for more than 3 decades, Douglas London discusses President Putin's and whether his inner circle could turn on him soon? And would Putin use a nuclear weapon, a man without morality says London.
I think it's dangerous when, uh, the liberal democracies, the West nato, uh, look at the world as having a set of rules that everyone respects. Putin's outlook is those rules were created by the liberal democracies to keep Russia down.
Speaker 2:We all understand what's at stake here, um, but it's in Russia's DNA not to stop. You know, they just don't, I don't see them stopping anytime soon, and they just could be warming up.
Speaker 3:Hi everyone, and welcome to another edition of backstory. I'm Dana Lewis. Two terrific guests this week. Douglas London is a former CIA chief of Station. He is a spy expert who says that Russian President Putin is like a shark who must keep moving to survive only in his case. The reason Putin is an object constantly in motion is to outrun his failures, change the narrative in his favor, and keep adversaries at bay. He deals with misfortune by doubling down. First, I talked to a US military analyst, a US major, who thinks the war is not going in Ukraine's favor, but it's a long road to understand where this war is going. First, I wanna say this, if you are following Ukraine and Russia's brutal invasion, I mean, there are moments for all of us when it just seems like more of the same and we tune out a bit. It's news fatigue. I mean, this was started almost a year ago on February the 24th, 2022. But I would say two key things are taking place, and they're notable. The arms being provided to Ukraine, even this week by the West, are becoming more offensive because no one wants this to drag on forever. And the imperative to defeat Putin is crystallized in many minds because if this stands, Russia will invade other countries. And so the push is on, and there's gonna be arms provided that allow Ukrainians to cut off this land bridge to Crimea and attack the Crimea itself. I mean, they're talking about armor from Poland, leopard tanks. The Brits are stepping up with armor. The US is sending in Bradley's. America certainly sees Crimea in Ukraine's crosshairs now, whereas a few months ago, maybe not, Crimea is also a trip wire for President Putin, who sees it as his historical achievement. It was an illegal invasion, but his historic achievement and what will he do when it comes under sustained attack. Alright. Mike Lyons is a retired major from the US military. He served in war zones, including Iraq, and he's a well-known commentator on Ukraine. Mike, great to meet you, sir.
Speaker 2:Thanks for having me.
Speaker 3:You did an inter interview in December, uh, calling for the US to provide the Patriot Missile Defense system, but you also warned that it's escalatory. And in insofar as this could actually turn into, you said, um, the US firing on a Russian aircraft over Russian territory, that's how, uh, dangerous it can be.
Speaker 2:Yeah. That, that's the biggest risk in this conflict Right now, the hard border is the Ukraine border as it aligns next to Russia, and the equipment that we've provided fundamentally staged within that sandbox. But if we provide patriot missiles, you could have a situation where Russian backfire bomber decides to come over the border into Ukraine, drop some kind of payload, A Patriot missile now chases that, uh, aircraft back is gonna go hide back in Russia, crosses that border and destroys a Russian aircraft across over Russia. I I think Russia will perceive that as a, as an act of war from the United States to Russia. And that's where it becomes escalatory. There's no way for us to bring that missile back. You can't destroy it in ma in air. So I think that's part of the risk of deploying Patriot missiles inside of Ukraine.
Speaker 3:And yet, if we don't, Ukraine is gonna be destroyed. Right. So you take a look at this, uh, just this past weekend, this, uh, missile that hit, uh, uh, DeNiro, where, you know, now they're saying at least 44 people were killed in that rubble mm-hmm.<affirmative>. Um, would the Patriot have stopped that? Or there are many missile batteries that will be needed?
Speaker 2:Well, yes. A Patriot missile could have stopped that. Uh, that's a, a Cage 22. It, it, it's launched from the air, but because of its altitude and you go up to 80,000 feet. Uh, and the way it was initially designed was to take out naval carrier groups because of the, its angle of attack. But the bottom line is Ukraine does not have any kind of forward air system that can detect that kind of missile, but the Patriot missile could. Um, and then it gets back to attack angles. It's ba a lot of kind of complexities. But the bottom line is all those cities that are close to the Black Sea are under threat because Russia has standoff. They can get 300 miles into the Black Sea Fire that weapon off. And the early detection systems they currently have can't pick up that kind of missile.
Speaker 3:How do you judge this winter war? I mean, it seems largely frozen, although Russia has made some advancements on the battlefield. If you take into account that they took the sodar and they are threatening Bach moot. What what do you think is happening? Really? If, if you can cut through some of the haze of the battlefield, then
Speaker 2:Well, sodar and Bach moot are really not strategic locations. And, and I think it's Russia trying to gain some kind of victory, some kind of, uh, inside morale boost that you're seeing. Vogner groups, uh, involved in both of those. Uh, they're mercenaries. You've seen them to start to speak out. They don't even believe the city's have been taken. Uh, they've both been virtually flattened. Uh, you know, world War I type, uh, operations that Russia is doing there. But what I see is Russia trying to keep their powder dry in the East in order to do more mobilization eventually in the next three months. In some ways, they're just warming up. They have this capability. They don't get rid of their weapon systems ever. Uh, it's in their DNA n to, to save these things. There's gonna be more equipment that's gonna come to the front. I think the Ukraine side doing the same. And they have to be careful not to expend a lot of resources now, uh, and decide and pick and choose where they're gonna fight. And what I mean by that is, uh, it's about an 800 kilometer front there that they're trying to, uh, have offensive operations are. And, and I think that they need to focus more in the South and, and really use, if they're going to give up forces, they give them up in the east, bring them to the South, because nothing's gonna happen on Ukraine side unless they gain leverage. And that leverage is the potential, uh, uh, of the threatening of Crimea. And if they can't do that, then I'm afraid the stalemate is gonna continue.
Speaker 3:So, is Ukraine making a strategic error of sorts? Because, uh, initially people said, well, you, they're, they're nimble. Uh, they're able to move fast. They're not like the slow moving dinosaur, uh, you know, of, of the Russian Army. But in the cases of Bmu especially, and this been going on for months, and it's, they've just been dug in. Ukrainians say they're killing a lot of Russians, but I mean, they're also taking losses.
Speaker 2:Well, u u Ukraine had the advantage of the defense on some level, but, and, but really, they, they could have prepared more for it in some places in the south. They were prepared. But what we saw in the beginning of this war, uh, they almost, uh, lost kyiv because they, they really didn't mobilize like they should have, and they had the advantage of the defense. And that coupled with Russia has not learned, they've not combined their arms. We thought Russia was going to fight a different way. We thought they were gonna combine artillery air superiority that we thought that they would have by now, uh, with ground forces. They just haven't done any of that. They've literally fought this literally almost one, you know, combat system at a time. And, and it's allowed the, the Ukraine military plus things like United States intelligence, more accuracy on the fires coming on the side of Ukraine, things that the, the West has imported into this conflict that have made a difference. But all it's done is just allowed Ukraine to keep the status quo, and it's allowed to keep that, that border currently that they c they have in the Doba region, which was under conflict since 2014. Anyway,
Speaker 3:I've never heard a good explanation why Russia with this huge Air Force, um, hasn't deployed it very well. And you have, you got one for me?
Speaker 2:Well, because as it turns out, the, they just don't train to kite combined, and they, and they don't, uh, they, they thought that this was going to go like Desert Storm did. They thought this was going to be a three day war. The allure of battle. Everybody wants these things to go very quickly, look in history. And so many times countries make that mistake. And so I knew that initially that Ukraine had a chance after the first day when Russia only fired 200 cruise missiles. Now, if that's the United States, if that's NATO or something, that they're firing 2000, 2,500, they're firing an overwhelming number of cruise missiles in the air to establish that air superiority going after air defense platforms going after all those things. Russia didn't do that. And so they don't, they, they fought this, again, very literally from a combat arms perspective. And the reason why that the, the, the Russian Air Force is not dominated is because of the Javelins and the stingers and the things that were in place, and they've threatened the airspace enough. And then you couple that with lack of training and lack of courage on the side of Russia, never combining those armed forces. And the airspace rema, the airspace remains uncontested. Uh, right now it's opened up to anybody who wants to, who wants to fly.
Speaker 3:Mike, how do you read reports that Russia may be preparing a new wave, uh, of attacks possibly coming from the north, from Belarus, and then coming from Russia itself, trying to put the squeeze on Kyiv yet again, maybe even as far in the West as Lavi and trying to cut off incoming supplies from European countries. Some people say it could be weeks away. Some people say, you know, in the next three months you could have a new, uh, attack wave ordered by President Putin.
Speaker 2:I, I think we have to be concerned about the North and, and Belarus, it's a short time of flight and any kind of, uh, uh, indirect fire coming from there. And, and that country brings in a tremendous real estate advantage. I I'm an army guy, so you look at the ground right as to where the advantage is that Russia could, could take, uh, advantage from, and that's one of them. And it's a different country. It opens up really another front. Um, and Ukraine doesn't have the forces to defend two fronts, uh, at this point. That's the sad reality of it, which is why if they get that patriot batter, it's likely going Toky, it protects the capital. It's, it's their Alamo from Alast stand perspective, but they then risk losing Odessa all those places to the south. You know, Russia controls a fifth of the land mass right now within Ukraine, and it's a highly profitable land mass. There's industrial complexes there. We fields all the things that Ukraine uses to generate revenue is in that space that Russia has and what, what they're stealing from right now. I think that, uh, if they do that, they open up those fronts. They're mobilizing more troops. They have, they have more capacity. Um, the question is whether the west brings in the offensive weapons, the tanks coming from potentially England, the United States, we're sending Brads in. Now the question is, uh, when can they get there and can they get there on time?
Speaker 3:Do you think the Bradleys will change the battlefield? There's 50 of'em.
Speaker 2:Yeah. Again, hard to say that that would tip the balance completely in the favor. It might tip a battle in their favor of Ukraine. And again, if they could, you know, the, the optimal situation for Ukraine, I think is to get 20 to 30,000 Russian soldiers to surrender. Let's say they cut off, uh, you know, they do a divide and conquer on the south there. If you look on a map, uh, on'em around, uh, not, not even as far, uh, east as Marie Opal, but, uh, in Cremator and some of those areas there, if they can kind of divide Russian forces, surround them, get a large number to 20,000 Russians to surrender, I think that would be a strategic goal for the Ukraine military that could really tip the balance back, gives them leverage the b if they want the fighting to stop Ukraine's, gotta have some leverage in order to get Russia to stop. And right now, they still don't have that
Speaker 3:Major. What do you think about this debate about the leopard tanks? I mean, Britain has come forward with 14 challenger two tanks. That's not a lot, but Right. It's thought that that will pave the road to put pressure on Germany. You have this meeting in Ramstein of defense ministers from about 50 countries, uh, p countries like Poland. As, as you've noted, I've watched you on the air on CNN this week saying that, you know, Poland, yes, it's, they're willing to give their leopard tanks to Ukraine, right? But there are export controls on those weapons. Germany has to sign off on them. They're the ones that produce the tanks. Does this debate matter that much if they're able to get that kind of armor into Ukraine? And do you think Germany will have to give ground in the end?
Speaker 2:Well, Ukraine's running outta time. It's as simple as that. They have to get crews trained. This is not a, you know, a a video game where they could just kind of add them to there and, and, you know, add water and, and get them to that spot. Um, crews have to be trained. They're different weapon systems. Uh, frankly, the dirty little secret about those German tanks in Germany, they're probably not working very well. Um, the Germans have completely, um, neglected their defense forces for the past 10 or 15 years and completely relied on nato. Unfortunately, we've let them do that. Um, and, and again, the British, the challenger tanks great, but, you know, 14 doesn't make a difference. You know, a US armored division has 360 main battle tanks in it. They need division worth of equipment. They need, you know, hundreds of main battle tanks. And to get them there is gonna take time. It's gonna take a rail system. They can't, you know, when the United States fights these wars, we, we use boats, we use rail, we use all kinds of ways to get those tanks there. They're, they're pre-positioned in poka stocks. None of that stuff is there online right now. What, what they can hope for is to get the old Soviet equipment that sits in some of those NATO countries, uh, that were formerly part of, of the Warsaw Pact, and, and possibly deploy those. But now they're lower, they're lower grade, they're still armored vehicles. They provide crew protection. They'll give the crew members confidence. Um, but again, Russia could eventually bring more of that kind of crappy, frankly, military equipment to the battlefield.
Speaker 3:So you are saying even if you were tomorrow, somebody, you know, push pushed the button in Berlin to give these weapons to Ukraine, considering the crews that need to maintain them, the equipment that has to get to them, the training of Ukrainians, I mean, you're, we're not talking about a couple of months. I mean, you're talking about six months or a year.
Speaker 2:Yeah, the first tank maybe shows up in 90 days. And that's, that assumes that you have a crew to put in on it. And we're not, they're, they're not being trained. You'd have to, you know, we're training some of the Patriot missile battery crews back at Fort Sill now. Uh, those, those that training only normally takes a year, year to 18 months. Uh, we're gonna try to do it in 30 to 40 days. I, I don't know, they're gonna make mistakes on that weapon platform. They might be, shoot, they might shoot down Ukraine helicopters. I mean, that, that's a complex weapon system with integrated radar and air defense capability that takes a, a while to get used to, to develop the instinct that you need when you're in combat to, to know that you're firing friend or fae. But, but the time is, again, not on their side. We'd have to start today. We'd have to, we'd have to start bringing those tanks to Poland, getting'em there and getting them prepositioned and then figuring out how they're gonna get them to the front. And, and, and again, time is not on the side of Ukraine.
Speaker 3:Alright. Right. Last question to you. Uh, and that would be, I spent a lot of time as a correspondent in Russia and I, we, we used to pass by some of these so-called secret cities that didn't even have names on them. Right. And that's where they produced weapons. Right? There is a huge assembly line in Russia, which I think, I don't think people fathom right, how big it was. I mean, this was a weapon producing state. It was the main thing that they, they produced. And President Putin is out there, uh, you know, irrigating, fertilizing that again, and tried to bring all that production back. He won't bring it all back, but he'll bring some of it back. Sure. So if you were to, to look through the haze of some of the very positive pictures that are painted about Ukraine and people talking about victory, uh, but with, and mix that with the reality really of what they're facing in terms of numbers. Um, and President Putin's willingness just to keep this going. Yeah. There are some pretty hard realities on the battlefield. Do you think that any victory is in sight or that Ukraine in fact is still in, in very, very deep danger and they could lose this war?
Speaker 2:Yeah, they're, they're in trouble. I mean, they, they kind of win right now by not losing in, in, on a day-to-day perspective. But strategically, Russia's four times everything over Ukraine, 10 times when it comes to the military capability, uh, from the industrial, uh, capacity that Russia has four x in terms of the amount of people they could throw at this. Um, the amount of people that have already left Ukraine, you know, they're just running outta people. They're running outta bodies in order to try to fight. Um, we all understand what's at stake here. Um, but it's in Russia's d n a not to stop, you know, they just don't, I don't see them stopping anytime soon, and they just could be warming up. Um, and, and the West has got to recognize that, um, in, in, in, you know, when I talk to people of Pentagon, they like the fact that the Russian military is being destroyed in place by Ukraine. So there's no question Ukraine is doing a big favor to the West, and I think there's gonna be a calculation when they figure out that Russia's conventional forces really can't threaten Europe anymore. And then maybe the offensive weapons go, and then maybe there, there's the leverage in order for them to stop. But there's a couple of things that re you that Russia's not giving up. One of them is Crimea. They, they're not giving up Sabasta poll. They're not giving up the Black Sea fleet that that's where it's their only warm water port that they have. So at some, some at some point, there's going to be something that to be said, um, for that. And, and then the question is whether or not those other areas that are in the Doba region, high industrial complexes, whether Russia ends up taking them over what the people wanna do there, uh, and, and, and the like. But Ukraine is gonna have to accept some level of, of negotiation if they want the artillery to stop. And if they want to survive and keep going.
Speaker 3:Ukraine says they won't. But, uh, let, let's, I guess everybody says that in conflict, don't they? In the midst of it. It's, there's a long road ahead and a lot of suffering to be
Speaker 2:Had. Both sides strategic, um, uh, objectives are not aligned. The, the Ukraine's strategic strategic objective is to get Russia out of all of Ukraine. They don't have the, the ways and the means to do that. Russia's strategic objective is to take all of Ukraine, uh, Kyiv, take it all the way to their, to their, uh, westernmost border. They don't have the military, uh, mission, and they don't have the st uh, the, the ways and means to do that. Uh, until one side figures out they've gotta change those strategic objectives. You're gonna co see the, still may continue.
Speaker 3:Major Mike Lyons. Great to talk to you, sir. Thank you so much.
Speaker 2:Hey, Dana, thanks so much for having me.
Speaker 3:Alright. Douglas London is a retired, decorated 34 year veteran of the central intelligence agency's clandestine service. And Mr. London's experience, uh, in the intelligence community includes multiple field assignments for the c I A as, uh, chief of station. And he was also director of National Intelligence, uh, in, in terms of being a representative of, of national intelligence. And that was the president's senior intelligence representative. Do I have that right, Douglas?
Speaker 1:Yeah. The, the d and i rep oversees, uh, is now the, like the, the president's ambassador for intelligence at that post.
Speaker 3:All right. Thank you for sending me straight on that. And you're also the author of the Recruiter Spying in the Lost Art of American Intelligence, and you also teach intelligence studies at Georgetown University's Foreign School or, or School of Foreign Service. So it's great to be able to have a chance to talk to you. And, you know, I was thinking what would I, what would I say to you in our, in our kind of our, our opening, um, and it reminds me when I was based in, in Moscow that I was, so sometime after President Putin came to power, probably around 2001, 2002, I was called in by the American Embassy. I was the, the N B C correspondent there at the time. And they said, we want you to understand that the game is back on. And I, I wasn't quite sure what they meant. I mean, I got an idea of what, what they were talking about, but you know, when I asked them to clarify it, they essentially said, the, the spy game between Russia and America has just shifted into overdrive with the presidents of pres, of, of the president of President Putin. Um, everywhere you go, everything you say, uh, who you talk to, who you call, who you see, all of that's being recorded, and you better know that, uh, um, you, you that you better be very, very careful from here on in. So, did, did the American intelligence community understand right away that President Putin was, was as dangerous as they do now?
Speaker 1:I think by the time Putin assumed the presidency, which is 2000, uh, by that time they had enough experience over the nineties to realize the spy game never stopped From the time of 1991, I think there was a desire on the part of the US government to reclaim this, um, peace dividend that the Russians were now leaning towards the West. They were gonna be democratic, they were gonna be our friends. And that really didn't last terribly long. But it did seem to endure long enough that, uh, the intelligence community probably took their eyes somewhat off the ball, focusing on what they thought would be other priorities. And in 95, you have Hansen is, uh, already backs spying for the Russians at that point. He had an on and off relationship over his many years of espionage, uh, Hansen being the, uh, f b i, uh, mole, who provided the identities of a number of very key c i agents. And we knew agents were, were going down. So we knew the game was very much on in the mid 1990s. But I think there was a reluctance, um, on the part of the US government overall, sort of in that five steps of, uh, of dealing with grief. First, one being denial that Putin was gonna be as bad as he was, but he had taken over the F S B in 1998, uh, internal, you know, um, you know, a successor to the kgb. And I think by that time we had a pretty good sense of his colors.
Speaker 3:And yet there was a miscalculation at different times too, because, I mean, did, didn't the US really seek a path of appeasement? Um, and even after like, you know, 2008, the Russians invaded Georgia or after the Crimea in 2014, and you know, I, it just seems that they kept wishing that President Putin would be somebody else.
Speaker 1:Well, uh, leaders, political leaders often look at the world as they wish it would be, as opposed to the way it is. And the United States was coming, um, on the heels of nine 11, very early into Putin's tenure as president. Uh, remember the famous six, uh, comments of President George W. Bush that I looked into his eyes, I saw his soul. So I think you're, you're spot on one saying there was a real desire and a hope that Putin would, uh, what
Speaker 3:Was that all about? What was that all about? Lots of people remember that. I mean, they, they just, they, they were able to kind of have a rapport on a one-on-one meeting. And, and that ma meant that President Bush felt that Putin was somebody he could do business with. And that, and then I think just right before that, or right after that, you know, people don't re don't remember now, but President Putin was invited to the US and he met with students and did a tour, um, you know, a little Gobek esque.
Speaker 1:Well, he was feeling his way, wasn't he, in his first terms as president? He even stepped aside on paper for Medvedev to become president for a while in 2008. But those first few years, the first eight years of his term, again, the United States was deeply involved with nine 11. And that was clearly our focus and would be our focus CT counter of terrorism for the next 20 years. I think Putin was feeling his way and trying to develop relationships. He's an intelligence officer. I mean, that's how he was trained and nurtured and conditioned. So intelligence officers tried to at least fein this personality of, you know, embracing kindness and friendship and nurturing that while really having another agenda and, and playing the old bait and switch as to what they're really up to.
Speaker 3:And yet, you know, a lot of people would argue at that time that President Putin was somewhat different, because at that, right after nine 11, I think he was the first phone call, uh, to, to Washington and, and President Bush after the attack occurred, and then he, they Russia opened up their airspace to allow, uh, weapons shipments to pass through Russia down into Central Asia and into Afghanistan. Uh, there was lots of intelligence sharing there. There was even talk still certainly more, uh, in President Yeltsin's era, but there was even talk still as President Putin was coming to power that, you know, maybe, uh, there can be great cooperation between Russia and nato. Maybe Russia would, would become a member of NATO one day. Certainly that was never utter uttered by President Putin himself. But things were very different.
Speaker 1:I think Russia and China both were being cautious that, uh, after nine 11, in terms of where they stood vis-a-vis the United States, Russia was coming out of a horrible financial crisis of 1998, which was devastating to it. Putin had, and I, and I do believe, uh, falsified the bombings of the apartment buildings in Moscow to allow for the second Chechen war. And I think Putin was very focused on what he thought getting the job done in Che as a bit of a quid pro quo, that the United States would leave him alone and Chesh building that up as a, as a terrorist state, as an accomplice of Bin Laden, if you would. So I, I don't really think it was until, uh, we see the events in Georgia and some of the comments Putin started to make around 2005 and 2006, where he was a bit more confident in taking a, a more confrontational role with the United States.
Speaker 3:What, what do you mean you think that Russia was, that President Putin was behind the bombings, the apartment bombings?
Speaker 1:Well, there's a great deal of press on the apartment bombings that took place over the course of 1999. I think the, towards the end of 1999, uh, there were serious apartment bombings at the, uh, Russian government, or at least Putin as remember he was, uh, director of the f SB before becoming the Deputy Prime Minister, and then eventually succeeding. Yeltsin,
Speaker 3:I, I covered those bombings, by the way, and I was there, and they were very suspicious because nobody claimed responsibility for them. And later on there was all sorts of evidence that f f SB cars left the area and were heard on the radios. And I mean, there was some pretty wild speculation that maybe President Putin and the F S B arranged these bombings as a trip wire, as an excuse to go and rein invade chenia. Do you actually believe it now?
Speaker 1:I think it's credible. Uh, I couldn't say with a hundred percent confidence, but the f sb, as you noted, the local FSB seemed to be on a different sheet of music than Petru. She who was director of the f SB at the time, and actually arrested, I believe, three FSP officials who were there present with a car in the garage that had, uh, explosives at the time. The story would rather be changed later on where they weren't really explosives. It was a test, it was a drill. But I think the early indications were credible that those were explosives, those were F SSP officers, and the local FSP itself were those who investigated and were putting those individuals on trial. So I think the evidence is rather compelling. I think, uh, maybe the US government and its classified holdings has a more accurate sense of it. But, you know, just for the likes of open source information, it seems credible to me.
Speaker 3:Let's shift gears a little bit. Do station chiefs, uh, and the c i a right assessments of President Putin, like, would a Moscow station chief, um, assess whether Putin would push the button on a, on a nuclear device? Um, are, are his members of his inner circle, are they solidly behind him or are there a cracks, cracks in that inner circle? I mean, how editorial do those assessments become? You must have written many of them. Um, and, and do the policy makers as I e the president of the United States, read those and listen to them?
Speaker 1:Well, there's different vehicles for a Chief of Station to express his or her point of view or perspective on developing events in their country. Uh, there's operational traffic, which goes strictly to the operational personnel in their chain of command, but there is a vehicle, an intelligence product, a raw intelligence product, which goes to the community, but it's only by requirement. Um, there's a, a certain name and nomenclature, which I can share with you, but if there's a desire on the part of policymakers to hear what the Chief of Station thinks on the head of state, uh, unrest in a local country, they will request that product. The chief of station then writes his or her assessment, but drawing on intelligence, the, the assessment has to be based on reporting that has already been disseminated to the community. So in a way, it's a somewhat an analytical product, but it's done in the form of a raw intelligence product. And it's done rarely, but it is usually in a time of unrest, tension, near conflict, some instability where the senior decision makers want to hear from the Chief of Station.
Speaker 3:What, what do you think they're writing about President Putin right now? If, if you were chief of Sta uh, uh, if you were chief of Station right now in Moscow, you, I I get the impression from reading some of the things that you've written that you would not be writing, that he is mentally unstable or, uh, that President Putin is, you don't buy into the crazy Putin theory.
Speaker 1:No, he's not. I I don't think he's crazy. I don't even think he's reckless. I just, uh, think he sees the world through a lens that we have real trouble understanding as westerners, as people who live in a liberal democracy and, and<laugh> outside the intelligence profession. I don't know necessarily that the Chief of Station has to do a lot of that, because I think the intelligence tells the story. The intelligence reporting that I imagine is coming from human sources, signals intelligence, and other forms of collection are itself providing a, a clinical picture and portrait of Putin, his style. Certainly what we've seen unclassified by the United States government and the British government as well in terms of, uh, plans, intentions and capabilities, reveals a pretty consistent picture that Putin has a plan. It, it's, uh, not necessarily a good plan or a successful plan. And it is, unfortunately, based on a calculus working off a false picture of what's going on, uh, because his intelligence services really aren't providing an accurate strategic picture. Instead, it's really just an echo chamber of his predetermined perspectives and points of view.
Speaker 3:You wrote recently, and I hope you don't mind me quoting, um, and we can do this in a podcast, and I think this, what's, that's, that's what's great about doing this instead of on live television where you don't have time. But let, let me just quote it. Policymakers would do well to remember three fundamentals that guide Putin's decision making. One is the product of the seventies and eighties, K G B, and stood witness in then East Germany in 1990. And in 1991, when the world knew it ceased to exist, two, ego, survival, greed and ambition, direct his moral compass. And three, uh, he's come to believe his own propaganda. So that's a little bit about what you were just saying about this, this echo chamber that in terms of his realities and how he perceives things, um, are, there's, there's a lot of, there's a lot of haze that he's looking through.
Speaker 1:Well, you actually remember when Putin came into the kgb, and I suspect it's still very much the same. It wasn't like, you know, you applied online or walked into the, the KGB office. Uh, the KGB looked for people and generally it looked for people who'd been informers, informers who were cooperating already with them or with the Communist Party. Uh, in Putin's case, my presumption is when he was at Len grad State University pursuing his degrees, which included one in law, that he was in fact reporting on his students because he didn't come from a particularly prestigious family. He didn't have a, a legacy connection as far as I understand, to the communist party party or the, the Soviet system, or specifically the Intel services. So the KGB would've had to have enough comfort and confidence in him to recruit him into the service because they had already been working with him once in the service. He was told, your part of the elite, you're the vanguard of the party. You're here to protect the party. And the party is everything. And the party is everything. Also, personally and professionally. It's how one advances and one advances through this kleptocracy, the corruption and the nepotism and patronage that goes along with the system. And that system is dominant over the immoral and dec and West, we hear comments from Putin and his inner circle, which you could just take straight out of 1970s Soviet propaganda, because that's what he grew up on. That's what he believes. And then in fact, he did go overseas. And what we understand to be is his only official overseas posting in Dresden in what was then East Germany. And he watched his world fall apart. He was there when the wall fell in November of 1989. He was there when protestors were storming the Stasi local headquarters across the street from his office. So those had a great
Speaker 3:Impact. That's by the way, in his book, right, that he stood out there while everybody's celebrating in the streets freedom, um, this great moment in history as the, as the Berlin Wall is coming down, he's standing there, he pulls out a handgun and, and he's ready to shoot them. Should they come into the Stai headquarters. He sees it as this great, uh, n not great dark moment, uh, in Soviet history.
Speaker 1:Yeah, I don't think it was quite as heroic as he claims in his own writing. Uh, uh, according to Stasi officers and K g b officers of his same gender, like the rest of the K G B, he was hiding under his desk and hoping that the protestors weren't coming across the street to their building, but they were busy burning and shredding documents at the time, expecting that it might happen. But it was for him, catastrophic. It was, you know, his world coming apart as it was for so many K G B officers, communist party officials at the time.
Speaker 3:You also wrote that there's no rules only consequences that shape his calculus. And you wrote that in the context of would Putin pushed the button, would Russia use nuclear weapons? Can you expand on that a bit?
Speaker 1:I think it's dangerous when, uh, the liberal democracies, the West nato, uh, look at the world as having a set of rules that everyone respects. Putin's outlook is those rules were created by the liberal democracies to keep Russia down to oppress. What was the Soviet Union coming out of World War ii, and then Russia as it emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union. So those aren't rules he ex he accepts. So I think when we, uh, get together and go, well, he's, you know, breaking the rules and stuff, those aren't his rules. In fact, if he was acknowledging rules of his predecessors, there'd be no war in Ukraine. Ukraine. The, so the Russian Federation in the United States made an agreement in the mid nineties when Ukraine turned over hiss nuclear weapons that respected the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine, which he has no use for. So what has impacted Putin's calculus isn't a rule, United Nations charter or a treaty, but what is it in it, what's in it for him or what could hurt him? And when there are consequences, that's what sets his behavior. And I think it's important to look at that, to understand what he's going to do, and particularly as we hope to at some point transition the conflict into negotiations, there have to be consequences for his actions that would get Putin to consider withdrawing, making changes or restraint.
Speaker 3:What kind of consequences? Because if we, if we're looking down the road, this is only gonna get worse, right? And, and, and if Ukraine, uh, becomes better armed, and, uh, there are discussions, you know, every day about giving them weapons that they haven't had before. And the West continually seems to be shifting in terms of what they're willing to do because they want Ukraine to win this thing, and they see that the cost of Ukraine losing, uh, w will, would, is a price tag simply too high for Europe, because Putin will move on and threaten other countries as well. Um, so, so then you have the, the discussion moving on to Crimea, and that Crimea certainly comes directly in the crosshairs of the Ukrainian military. So, uh, if, if I take the picture you paint about Putin, um, and whether he would use a nuclear weapon or not, or how desperate he may, may be come, and when he is backed into a corner, what he might do, forgive me for the long question, but none, none of that adds up to anything good.
Speaker 1:I subscribe to the theory that, uh, though we find it head scratching to understand that Putin took this action in Ukraine, both in 2014 and again in 2022, because he actually felt Ukraine's development, its evolution of its relations with the West, was a direct threat to him and his power. I think the key issue for Putin is retaining power and, and, you know, dying a peaceful death. And from what I've seen in open source, which I, I I put some confidence in, he was very much moved by scenes of Wilmar K's demise in Libya during the time of the Arab Spring, seeing him, you know, pulled out of a sewer, beaten to a pulp, and then ultimately shot, uh, losing power. And I think that's his nightmare scenario is that losing power and losing power in such a way. So what what Putin is motivated by better or for worse, uh, is his power, that which stabilizes his power and that which threatens his power. And I subscribe to the, the theory that he believed he had to do something about Ukraine to at least secure Crimea and, um, preempt the influence a prospering, pluralistic, uh, Ukraine would have on his own country right next door by trying to do something about it. I think similarly, that which we can leverage that both incentivizes his belief by taking path A and path B, he'll secure his power in a situation, whereas path C and D threaten his position is probably gonna have more impact because it's based on consequences, not on any set of rules or negotiations.
Speaker 3:You know, there are so many Russians who, and I I appreciate your comment on it, who believe that if you look at the Orange Revolution, which I covered in Ukraine, um, and then later on the Mayan revolution, that this was the West, that this wasn't a natural uprising by Ukrainians who wanted to join the eu or wanted to join nato or wanted to be closer to Europe. This was the US in there fixing the field, the c i A, um, paying for, for those people to be in the street, that this was a conspiracy, uh, by nato. Um, H h you know, what, what do you say to them when, when you, when you look back at those, those events and I, I cover them and, uh, certainly I know from my personal experience in the street, I mean these, these were Ukrainians at a heartfelt moment. It felt that the democracy was being stolen from them. But I mean, Russia has, has spun the myth that it was a Western conspiracy.
Speaker 1:I think one of the things Putin has done extremely well is the messaging and narrative, uh, uh, in his own domestic population. I, I think it's act absolutely true that, uh, of majority of Russians, at least Russians of an older generation, uh, very much believe the stories that Russian state media report. And really that's what they, that's where they get their information from Russian state media, the young, how many hundreds of thousands apparently have already left those who don't depend necessarily on Russian state media, but those who, who, particularly those who remember the 1998 financial crisis, and they think about the Moscow apartment buildings really do see Putin as their heroic savior, as their strong man. And, and you've lived there, Dana and I, and, and I hope you'll, you'll take, um, some, uh, uh, conference in my comments that Russians prefer stability over anything else, and they will make trade offs for their own rights for stability, because they've seen a lot of instability in their lives. Sure. So
Speaker 3:I think, and you, and you track them in public opinion polls. Oh, yes. And you ask'em about democracy, which you and I, I mean, we grew up on, you know, the, the, it's like drinking water for us, and they see chaos. Yes, they do. In, in parallel with, with democracy and lawlessness. And, you know, Putin is br was Mr. Stability at one point, is he now
Speaker 1:To some point, at least the messaging that he puts out, he stability in sense of the domestic situation? I don't think the economy has been rocked to the extent that the West thought it was gonna be by sanctions. I think over time it'll continue to pinch. I think Pune has been very careful about prioritizing mobilization among ethnic minorities, uh, remote regions as opposed to, if you would, his political base, if we wanna refer to his political base, so the more urban suburban and, and affluent Russian communities in St. Petersburg and Moscow and, and those areas. So I think he's done a good job. I I don't think it can last forever. I think the economic impact, I think the loss of lives will take their toll. But even so, I don't see the unrest being that which takes him down. I don't see the millions of people. It's a hundred, four 40 million people in that country coming out to the street. I think it would be people who are taking a loss closer to Putin who might be more likely to act on him than it would be a great revolution. But who's to say at this point,
Speaker 3:Well, let's hear your prediction. Does, does Putin survive this? Um, or, or do you think that this is his, his final chapter, the invasion of and and failed war in Ukraine?
Speaker 1:I would be inclined to think he survives it. I'd be inclined to think that Putin at some point will create his own off ramp, which will look very heroic and glorious and successful. Uh, but I don't eliminate the possibility, you know, intelligence, we talk about high conference assessments, low conference assessments. So my high conference assessment is he survives it and finds his own off ramp. If there's sufficient pressure on him, if the cohesion of the alliance remains, and if the West continues to provide Ukraine the weapons it needs and gives him maybe a little more maneuvering room to hurt Putin. But I also would say there's a low conference possibility that he doesn't survive it, that he's unseated by those in his own inner circle who probably have the greatest capacity to do so, rather than some massive uprising in the street.
Speaker 3:Douglas, London, uh, formerly with the, the c i A for, for, uh, more than three decades. It's re really been an honor to talk to you. Thank you so much.
Speaker 1:Thanks so much, Dana. It's been my pleasure. And
Speaker 3:That's our backstory this week. Thanks to Major Mike Lyons in Douglas, London. If you enjoy the podcast, we only ask that you share it. Thanks for listening to Backstory. I'm Dana Lewis and I'll talk to you again soon.